Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies

Senior Executive Seminar – "Maritime Security: Present Challenges and Opportunities for Cooperation"



Seminar Report 21–25 April 2025





Seminar Report 21–25 April 2025 Location: Washington, D.C.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

From 21 to 25 April 2025, the Near East South Asia (NESA) Center for Strategic Studies conducted a Senior Executive Seminar featuring 43 participants from 33 countries focusing on maritime security, developments in adaptable technology for the maritime domain, and how the Indo-Pacific impacts global security calculations. Topics specifically discussed during the seminar include the underwater domain, information fusion, adoption of critical and emerging technology, maritime aggression, ISR, geopolitical competition, and transnational criminality at sea. Speakers at the event included private sector leaders from technological firms and think tanks, along with U.S. government departments to provide the participants the perspective on how Washington is crafting policy to address an age of greater competition that has relevance to the maritime domain. Key insights and recommendations follow, as well as a record of the agenda and the results of the tabletop exercise conducted.

LEARNING OUTCOMES:

This course seeks to achieve the following outcomes amongst all who take part:

- How traditional and non-traditional security challenges are shaping our seas
- How states can more effectively operate at sea and cooperate with like-minded actors to enhance the security of the global commons
- How various forms of public-private engagement shape efforts for maritime security
- How technology informs contemporary maritime and naval operations
- How contemporary maritime security efforts go beyond a singular focus on the maritime domain and must integrate a cross-domain approach
- How does the United States conceive of its own naval and maritime operating picture
- Finally, a better vision of what challenges remain over the horizon when it comes to greater regional and global security.

INSIGHTS:

- Participants showed specific interest in ways to further engage in the underwater domain. Several nations wanted deeper dives into Underwater Domain Awareness and mechanisms to assist that enterprise. Several more wanted to explore how to gain operational capacity in that domain and how established maritime powers are conceiving of their efforts under the surface.
- In the tabletop exercise, participants rallied around sustaining existing rules and norms for maritime security when navigating the challenge sets. This was shown by common adherence to UNCLOS, various multinational institutions (IORA, ASEAN, CMF), and an understanding of the necessity of shared operational burdens.
- The nature of competition between established powers remains an area of interest for many participants. Whether such competition takes place in orbit, in economics, in technological advancement, or on the seas, all regional actors know that how the major powers interact will, in some way, impact their own conditions.
- U.S.-China rivalry overhung most conversations, with participants wanting to know what the efforts of the new administration will emphasize and how tensions will be managed. This was revealed through ongoing questions regarding the tariffs levied against China and those imposed by China against the U.S., along with the 2027 "window" fast approaching regarding Admiral Davidson's prediction of when a U.S.-China conflict could emerge.
- Technological innovation and the security dimensions of that enterprise were widely questioned. Namely, participants wondered about the ethics of various forms of technological innovation, the ability to trust software from foreign sources, the legal dimensions of contracts regarding technology, and the lack of international standards regarding key technologies, such as AI/ML, aerospace, and sensing.
- Per technology's impact on security, participants also questioned how the rise of private sector technological firms will impact the sovereignty of nation states.
- Participants showed a diverse view of the long-term viability of existing international agreements, international law, and multilateral institutions. Participants deeply respect such institutions, but it is increasingly clear that countries can evade the rules these institutions have created without massive costs imposed on them. For example, UNCLOS is followed by many, but China has signed and does not follow, and the U.S. has not ratified. With technology advancing so rapidly, some institutions cannot keep pace. Questions were asked about how to empower the international system.
- The questions about multilateralism gave way to questions about the wisdom of minilaterals, namely the Quad. Is the Quad an Asian NATO? Is the Quad all about China? Is the Quad even effective?

• Many questions posed by the participants centered on transnational criminality and exploitation of the seas themselves. Food security remains a key concern for many littoral states, so the protection of fish stocks is increasingly a major worry. The increase cooperation between various criminal enterprises is a concern – cartels, smugglers, and violent extremists are operating in proximity to one another. Issues that were seemingly addressed, such as piracy, are creeping back into commonality.

POLICY RELEVANT POINTS:

- More concerted multilateral efforts need to be directed towards underwater domain awareness. Discussions of the seabed, undersea cables, and other matters need to be more commonly addressed in regional security conversations, exercises, and training forums.
- Information sharing, particularly in relation to various forms of maritime criminality, needs to be further invested in by all responsible actors. The proliferation of illegal fishing, illicit ship-to-ship transfers, smuggling, and armed robbery/piracy do not respect national boundaries and often use borders/boundaries to facilitate their crimes. Noting that national sovereignty becomes entangled with all information sharing mechanisms, there must be greater emphasis on how to move faster.
- Discussions of multilateral institutions also need to be more commonly a part of international security meetings. An assessment of what is working and what is not and how to potentially merge organizations that duplicate efforts is a logical step that can be facilitated by security institutions. This is particularly relevant when discussing domain awareness of various forms (air, maritime, space, cyber).
- Communications about the ethics and standards of critical and emerging technology need to advance along with searches to adopt these technologies. What producers of technology can be trusted? What standards define these technologies? This is a global issue and needs global comment on how to advance transparency and reliability.

FINAL AGENDA:

All discussions will be held off-the-record, under the <u>Chatham House rule of non-attribution</u>. All participants are urged <u>(strongly urged in fact)</u> to ask questions and provide comments during sessions, with the reminder to keep such contributions direct and brief so as to ensure we can maximize participation.

Monday, 21 April 2025

0715	Participants Depart Lodging for Fort Myers		
0830–1100	Processing for	or Base Entry at Fort Myers Visitor's Center	
1100–1115	Transportatio	n to Fort Lesley J. McNair/NESA	
1115–1215	Participants A	Arrive at NESA, Lunch and Registration	
1215–1220	Welcome Speaker:	Prof. Jeffrey Payne , NESA Center for Strategic Studies	
1220–1235	Director's W Speaker:	V elcome Ambassador (ret) John Desrocher, Director, NESA Center for Strategic Studies	
1235–1250	Course Over Speakers:	rview and Participant Introductions Prof. Jeffrey Payne , NESA Center for Strategic Studies Dr. Gawdat Bahgat , Distinguished Professor, NESA Center for Strategic Studies	
1250-1300	Break		
1300–1400	Session 1: C Moderator: Speaker	ritical Technology Prof. Jeffrey Payne , NESA Center for Strategic Studies Mr. Corey Johnston, Economic Security Commissioner, Krach Institute for Tech Diplomacy, Purdue University	
1400–1415	Break		
1415–1545	Inaugural S Moderator: Speaker:	ession: The Maritime Domain and Contemporary Challenges Prof. Jeffrey Payne, NESA Center for Strategic Studies Admiral (ret) James G. "Jamie" Foggo, Dean, Center for Maritime Strategy, Navy League of the United States and former Commander, United states Naval Forces Europe-Africa and Allied Joint Force Command Naples	

- 1545–1605 Group Photograph Location: Marshall Hall Atrium
- 1605 Conclusion of Day / Participants Depart for Lodging

Tuesday, 22 April 2025

0800	Participants Depart Lodging for Fort Lesley J. McNair/NESA			
0845	Participants Arrive at NESA			
0900–0905	Welcome and Announcements			
0905–1050	Session 2: TI Moderator: Speakers:	he Indo-Pacific Dr. Gawdat Bahgat, Distinguished Professor, NESA Center for Strategic Studies Ms. Yun Sun, Stimson Center Dr. Dawn Murphy, Associate Professor of National Security Strategy, National War College		
1050–1115	Break			
1115–1200	Exercise Intr Speakers:	roduction Prof. Jeffrey Payne, NESA Center for Strategic Studies Dr. Gawdat Bahgat, Distinguished Professor, NESA Center for Strategic Studies		
1200–1300	Lunch			
1300–1400	Session 3: Pe Moderator: Speaker:	erspectives on MARSEC from the Department of State Dr. Gawdat Bahgat, Distinguished Professor, NESA Center for Strategic Studies Ms. Nancy Izzo Jackson, Senior Advisor, NESA Center for Strategic Studies; and Deputy Assistant Secretary (former), Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA), Department of State		
1400–1500	Special Sessi Moderator: Speaker:	on: Views from PACFLT (Virtual) Prof. Jeffrey Payne, NESA Center for Strategic Studies Admiral Stephen T. "Web" Koehler, Commander, United States Pacific Fleet		
1500–1515	Break			
1515–1630	Exercise – R Facilitators:	ound 1 Prof. Jeffrey Payne, NESA Center for Strategic Studies		

Dr. Gawdat Bahgat, Distinguished Professor, NESA Center for Strategic Studies

1630 Conclusion of Day / Participants Depart for Lodging

Wednesday, 23 April 2025

- 0800 Participants Depart Lodging for Fort Lesley J. McNair/NESA 0845 Participants Arrive at NESA 0900-0905 Welcome and Announcements 0905-1100 **Session 4: Our Maritime Security Challenge Set** Moderator: **Dr. Gawdat Bahgat**, Distinguished Professor, NESA Center for Strategic Studies Speakers: **Dr.** Assis Malaquias, Academic Dean, Africa Center for Strategic **Studies Dr. Hayoun Ryou-Ellison**, Assistant Professor, College of International Security Affairs, National Defense University Dr. Geoffrey F. Gresh, Professor, College of International Security Affairs, National Defense University
- 1100–1115 Break

1115–1245 Exercise – Round 2 Facilitators: Prof. Jeffrey Payne, NESA Center for Strategic Studies Dr. Gawdat Bahgat, Distinguished Professor, NESA Center for Strategic Studies

1245–1400 Lunch

1400–1530	Session 5: Conversation regarding U.S. Executive Approaches to Foreign Policy					
	Moderator:	Prof. Jeffrey Payne , NESA Center for Strategic Studies				
	Speakers:	LTG (ret) Terry Wolff, Distinguished Professor, NESA Center for Strategic Studies; and Senior Director (former), Middle East, White House National Security Council				
1515–1530	Break	·				

1530–1630Session 6: Maritime Security and Technological Innovation
Moderator:
Speakers:Prof. Jeffrey Payne, NESA Center for Strategic Studies
Ms. Abigail Desjardins, International Outreach, Defense
Innovation Unit, United States Department of Defense

1630 Conclusion of Day / Participants Depart for Lodging

Thursday, 24 April 2025

0800	Participants Depart Lodging for Fort Lesley J. McNair/NESA			
0845	Participants Arrive at NESA			
0900–0905	Welcome and Announcements			
0905–1100	Session 7: Va Virtual) Moderator: Speakers:	Prof. Jeffrey Payne , NESA Center for Strategic Studies Mr. Ray Powell , Director, SeaLight Mr. Gregory Poling , Senior Fellow and Director, Southeast Asia Program and Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Center for Strategic and International Studies		
1100–1115	Break			
1115–1245	Session 8: No Moderator: Speakers:	w Frontiers – Technology and the Maritime Domain Dr. Gawdat Bahgat, Distinguished Professor, NESA Center for Strategic Studies Dr. Jaclyn Kerr, Senior Research Fellow, CSR, INSS, NDU Mr. Evan Accardi, Director for Intelligence Engineering, Hawkeye 360		
1245–1345	Lunch			
1345–1515	Exercise – Fi Facilitators:	nal Round Prof. Jeffrey Payne, NESA Center for Strategic Studies Dr. Gawdat Bahgat, Distinguished Professor, NESA Center for Strategic Studies		
1515–1530	Break			
1530–1600	Exercise – Fi Facilitators:	nalizing Results/Conclusions/Presentation Preparation Prof. Jeffrey Payne, NESA Center for Strategic Studies Dr. Gawdat Bahgat, Distinguished Professor, NESA Center for Strategic Studies		
1600–1630	Alumni, Med Speakers:	lia, and GlobalNet Briefing <i>Mr. Christopher Muller</i> , NESA Center for Strategic Studies		
1630	Conclusion of	f Day / Participants Depart for Lodging		

Friday, 25 April 2025

0800	Participants D	Depart Lodging for Fort Lesley J. McNair/NESA
0845	Participants A	arrive at NESA
0900–0905	Welcome and	d Announcements
0905–1030	Special Session Moderator: Speakers:	on: A Horizon Scan for Future Challenges <i>Prof. Jeffrey Payne</i> , NESA Center for Strategic Studies <i>Dr. Gawdat Bahgat</i> , Distinguished Professor, NESA Center for Strategic Studies <i>Dr. Michael Sharnoff</i> , Associate Professor, NESA Center for Strategic Studies <i>Professor Charles B. Marks (Chuck)</i> , Associate Dean and Professional Military Education, NESA Center for Strategic Studies
1030–1045	Break	
1045–1115	Exercise Pres Facilitators:	sentations Prof. Jeffrey Payne , NESA Center for Strategic Studies Dr. Gawdat Bahgat , Distinguished Professor, NESA Center for Strategic Studies
1115–1145	Break	
1145–1200	Academic De Speaker:	ean's Farewell <i>COL (ret) Rich Wiersema</i> , Associate Dean, NESA Center for Strategic Studies
1200–1230	Alumni Cert Presenters:	ificate Ceremony <i>COL (ret) David Lamm</i> , Deputy Director, NESA Center for Strategic Studies <i>COL (ret) Rich Wiersema</i> , Associate Dean, NESA Center for Strategic Studies
1230–1245	Course Facil Speakers:	itators' Farewell Mr. Jeffrey Payne, NESA Center for Strategic Studies Dr. Gawdat Bahgat , Distinguished Professor, NESA Center for Strategic Studies
1245–1345		e ption Floor Hallway, Lincoln Hall velcome along with all participants)
1345	Conclusion of	f Course / Participants Depart for Lodging

BREAKOUT SCENARIO AND RESULTS:

Senior Executive Seminar Tabletop Scenario Week of April 21–25 2025

The following scenario is built upon real world examples of maritime challenges, and you are charged with reaching a set of recommendations that represent the consensus of your group. These recommendations can be diplomatic, economic, legal, or military in nature.

INITIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

Each of you is assigned to one of two breakout groups. Each group will have one of the two program leaders in the room to assist you. Group 1 has Professor Payne attached to it. Group 2 has Dr. Bahgat attached to it.

Your first task in your respective group is to determine a process for the following responsibilities:

- Designate a Presenter or Presenters for your group's final conclusions at the end of the week.
- Designate a notetaker for the group that will collect the conclusions your group reaches in the exercise
- NOTE: all members of the group are expected to assist the notetaker and presenter in the fulfillment of their responsibilities

After these roles are determined, your group will begin the formal exercise.

The exercise occurs in stages with additional data being revealed over time. During the exercise, the two groups cannot interact with one another unless given specific instructions that communication between groups can occur.

THE EXERCISE:

The details of your respective groups are detailed below, along with the larger environment in which the exercise occurs.

• Group 1/Country 1:

You represent a senior leadership crisis response group charged with providing policy recommendations to the chief executive of the country. You represent various ministries within the government and convene only when a national security challenge presents itself.

Your country is a littoral state within a region mostly constituted of developing economies, but you have a stronger and larger economy than most of the immediate neighbors. You are considered by much of the world to be a middle power based on your diplomatic, military, and economic resources. Country 2 is not a regional neighbor. Comprehensive details about your country are:

- Possesses a large and capable military comparable to immediate neighbors but still suffers from capability gaps
- Your country is not considered an established maritime power
- Your economy remains focused on natural resource exports and simple manufacturing sectors
- Your country is a rising technological power but does not possess the domestic capacity to match more established technological-focused economies
- Your country's economic focus is infrastructure modernization and development, the nurturing of a domestic technological and service sector, and training a workforce that can facilitate economic growth.
- Your country does have a committed and professional cohort that works on maritime domain awareness, but your country lacks the domestic capabilities to build the technology to enhance this work and does not have resources to purchase all the tools needed from foreign sources
- Your history with Group 2's country has been inconsistent. At times, you have hostile relations with them but also periods of intense cooperation.
- Of the three global "major powers," you have an established positive relationship with one, an emerging partnership with another, and an intensifying rivalry with the third.
- Group 2/Country 2

You represent a senior leadership crisis response group charged with providing policy recommendations to the chief executive of the country. You represent various ministries within the government and convene only when a national security challenge presents itself.

Your country is a littoral state within a region where you exist as the largest economic, political, and military actor. You are considered a developed economy and a global power. Country 1 is not a regional neighbor. Comprehensive details about your country are:

- Possesses a large and capable military that is unmatched in your region and has global reach.
- Your country is considered a major maritime power
- Your economy is built upon innovation, finance, and service industries
- Your country is considered one of (if not the) most technologically adept countries on the planet. You enjoy a highly developed academic system that provides ample expertise and is a major location for the patenting of new products
- Your country's economic focus is on maintaining its technical and technological global leads in a variety of industries, ensuring that you remain the key node for global supply chains, and confirming a dominant position in global markets
- You have developed a variety of maritime domain awareness tools that are produced by government entities and commercial firms that provide satellite imagery, dark vessel detection, various forms of sensing, and software designed to protect critical coastal and underwater infrastructure.
- Your history with Group 1's country has been inconsistent. At times, you have hostile relations with them but also periods of intense cooperation.

• Your country is one of three commonly recognized global powers. You have historically been rivals of the other two.

THE SCENARIO, PART I:

NOTE: Groups 1 and 2 cannot communicate with one another.

On the 19th of April at around 1600 local time, a Panamax container ship claimed that it was boarded by an unidentified group of individuals who thereafter gathered the crew and robbed them before departing. The vessel was flagged to a third country but owned by a company headquartered in Country 2. The vessel reporting an armed robbery at sea is currently back underway on its previous route.

Roughly three hours later, a regional passenger ferry was similarly boarded by an unidentified group of individuals who took control of the ferry and taken the passengers hostage. Citizens of Country 2 are on board the passenger ferry. Both the armed robbery and the hostage situation occurred near Country 1, but the events took place beyond Country 1's exclusive economic zone.

Approximately 1 hour ago, a widescale internet and communications outage occurred in the capital region of Country 1. It is suspected that the subsea cable facilitating connectivity for the capital region was damaged or cut. The cable runs from Country 1 to a regional neighbor approximately 1200 miles away. The regional neighbor has reported no communication interruptions save in relation to Country 1. Country 1 immediately checked the status and security of the landing station for the subsea cable. No problems at the landing station were discovered.

A quick review by Country 1's maritime security services indicated that a container ship altered its original course and slowed down. The vessel's behavior is consistent with the dropping of its anchor and the change in course placed the vessel in the location for the subsea cable's track. The vessel was within the exclusive economic zone of Country 1. The vessel in question has resumed its original course. It is flagged to a country known for providing flags of convenience and it is registered to a company in Country 3 where it is the only vessel owned by the company. Country 3 is also a major power, like Country 2. There were seemingly no other vessels in the area at the time according to AIS.

As a crisis response group for each of your countries, please discuss what the proper response should be to these events – including what government resources should be brought to bear, what government operations need to be directed, what diplomatic overtures must be made, and what role additional stakeholders play. Be as precise and detailed as you can in your conclusions.

THE SCENARIO, PART II:

NOTE: Each group IS Allowed to consult with each other but can only send TWO representatives at a time to talk. It is RECOMMENDED that you determine ahead of time what to share with the other group and what you are requesting of the other group.

The hostage situation on the ferry continues, but the armed group on board has demanded a 7.5 million U.S. dollar ransom for the release of the passengers. The vessel has moved further away

from Country 1's exclusive economic zone. Records detail that the ferry had 225 passengers on board with 42 crew members on board. There are no reports of fatalities, though the hostage takers announced that at least 10 individuals on board were injured with one seriously wounded. Surveillance indicates 7 armed individuals as visible on the deck. There are no accurate estimations of the total number of hostage takers on the vessel.

The company that laid the subsea cable has certified that damage has occurred and that it will immediately move a vessel to the area to begin making repairs. The nearest cable support vessel owned by the company is currently 8 days away. Initial estimates by Country 1 detail that for every day the cable is offline the secondary impact will be approximately 5-6 million U.S. dollars lost.

Country 1 has sent vessels to the area where the damage is suspected to have occurred where it discovered an autonomous underwater vehicle (an ocean glider) that is seemingly owned by Country 2 based on markings and design. Such gliders are generally used for oceanographic research. It was recovered inside Country 1's exclusive economic zone. Country 3 has made no official comment on the subsea cable, though Country 3's Ambassador to Country 1 gave a speech today detailing the long history of positive relations between both countries and the history of discord between Country 1 and Country 2.

As a crisis response group for each of your countries, please reflect on your initial recommendations and assessments based on the new information provided to the scenario. Remember to note updates to your recommendations.

THE SCENARIO PART III:

NOTE: Groups 1 and 2 cannot communicate with one another.

International media reports have detailed comments made at an international security conference in Country 3 by Country 3's Foreign Secretary. The comments focused on two areas. First, Country 3 without hesitation denies any involvement in the cutting of the subsea cable and that it has evidence that the cable was actually cut by a vessel running dark at the time that they have tracked and found to be flagged to a country that is a close neighbor of Country 2. Second, to ensure that future maritime challenges, like the hostage situation and the subsea cable disruption, are not as common, Country 3 is offering to its partners, including Country 1, a new regional maritime domain awareness software package that fuses various data streams into one visual display. It has offered it to most of the region at no cost and will offer training on how to use it. The software requires particular uploading that can only be installed by government-approved engineers from Country 3. Country 3 is not offering the software to Country 2.

Additionally, the hostage situation remains active and the private company that owns the ferry is planning to provide the ransom for the release of the vessel, passengers, and crew. The company has announced plans to end the ferry route after this incident, despite it being a common regional route relied upon by private companies that send migratory labor throughout the region for various industrial needs (construction, infrastructure maintenance, and various forms of mineral extraction/mining).

Finally, Country 1's maritime security assets, including its coast guard and navy, remains mobilized. Country 2 has sent several of its warships into regional waters. Country 3 has also sent a small flotilla of naval vessels into regional waters. Additional countries have also sent naval vessels, reflecting the greatest concentration of naval power in regional waters in over a decade. Save Country 1, all naval vessels in the region are operating in the high seas

As a crisis response group for each of your countries, please reflect on your initial recommendations and assessments based on the new information provided to the scenario. Remember to note updates to your recommendations.

GROUP RESPONSES:

Country 1



Introduction: Estimated Situation

The state is facing a complex crisis involving the armed robbery of a ship, the hijacking of a passengerferry, and a communication and internet out age in the capital due to a malfunction in the underse acable. This crisis requires a coordinated response from all relevant entities to ensure stability, protect national security, and maintain international relations.

Introduction: Estimated Situation Continued

<u>Incident 1:</u> Container ship robbery flagged to 3rd country, which was denied by the Foreign Secretary, and owned by companyin country #2 which is willing to provide the ransom

<u>Incident2</u>: Passengeferry hijacked, hostageson board (includingcountry 2 citizens)

Incident3: Cabledamageunderthe sea

Incident 4: Hijackers demanding\$7.5 million in ransom 11 individuals injured, 1 individual seriously wounded Country #3 publicly denied involvement, shifts blame to country #2's neighbor The companystated "ferry is a commonregionalroute mainly for construction infrastructure, maintenance".

Diplomatic - Hijacked Ferry

<u>ResponseAction:</u> Request the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to call the ambassadoof country#2. Let him know that even though the situation is happening outside of the EEZ, we will make an effort to handle this situation Request country#3, which is a major power in the region, for assistance

<u>Time:</u> In 1-2 days, we need to get in contact with the ambassadors we have a better understanding of the situation.

Diplomatic - Hijacked Ferry Continued

<u>Risk</u> There could be an understandingor escalation between the two countries if the passengers rom country #2 are injured or killed.

<u>Benefit</u> There could be de escalation between the two countries At the diplomatic level, the de escalation can show that we are open to cooperation and collaboration

Diplomatic - Disruption of Undersea Cable

Responsection:

- The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will contact the ambassadorof country#2.
- Let him know that we have noticed a ship owned by his country is involvedin an action of sabotagein our EEZ
- Request country #3 for more pressure on country #2 for its aggressivæction in our waters. Additionally, request assistance from country #3 for the issue with the underseacable. Request evidence from country #3 regarding cutting of cable by dark vessel Request the types of MDA software for free of charge Request for capacity building in relation to the software, its maintenance, and its engineers for installation

Diplomatic - Disruption of Undersea Cable Continued

Time: Immediateaction

Risk The relation with country#2 couldbecometense.

Benefit: Strengthenties with country#3.

Diplomatic - Hijacked Ferry and Disruption of Undersea Cable Continued

ResponseAction:

- Establish military (naval) partnership to protect our sea lane of communicationand make our waters safer.
- Signa bilateral agreement with country #3 for information sharing and exchange of knowledge and technology.
- Cooperationwith country#3 is already enough for us. We don't need other foreign help.

Military/Security

ResponseAction:

- 1. Prepare military units who will be acting in this situation
- 2. Greater intelligencein terms of hostagenationality
- 3. Regionalsurveillanceby other neighboringcountriesis in progress
- 4. Establishlines/meansof communicationamongthe tactical units of respectivenations

Time: Immediateaction

<u>Risk</u> Low/medium

Benefit:

- Units are prepared to act within a short amount of time
- Intelligenceis gathered regarding the nationality of the hostages

Economic

ResponseActions

- Quick ResponseFund/EmergencyFund
- Accept the offer of Country #3 for MDA software subject to conditions

<u>Time</u>: Immediateaction

RiskNIL/minimal

<u>Benefit:</u> Quick restoration of internet accesshumanitarianresponse and funding of all activities involved in the quick response

<u>Opportunities</u> Refund from the insurancecompanyfor the repair of the seacable will take long, but a contingent fund may be appropriate to fully restore internet access

Economic

ResponseActions

- QuickResponseFund/EmergencyFund
- Accept the offer of Country #3 for MDA software subject to conditions

<u>Time:</u> Immediateaction

Risk NIL/minimal

<u>Benefit:</u> Quick restoration of internet accesshumanitarianresponse, and funding of all activities involved in the quick response

<u>Opportunities</u> Refund from the insurancecompanyfor the repair of the sea cable will take long but so a contingent fund may be appropriated to fully restore internet access

Information/Communication - Hostage and Robbery

<u>Response Action</u>: Immediate statement to show empathy and condemn unlawful acts in the sea.

- <u>Internal:</u> reassure sea workers and passengersthat everything will be under control exploiting international cooperation
- <u>External</u>: encouragethe cooperation in high sea with countries willing to ensure MDA (such as Country 3 but not only) in cooperation Still concern for the Hostages and we wish safe sea-routes will allow the Ferry Companies to restore their operations

Time: Immediate action

<u>Risk</u> Low

<u>Benefit:</u> Resume confidence in transportation and receiving export goods from overseas

Information/Communication - Outage

ResponseAction:

- Internal: make an immediate statement saying we are strongly committed to resume regular use of the resources while persecuting the others.
- External: we are open to international cooperation ensuring all information to solve the incident and prevent further occurrences CoordinatedNaval Presencewill allow it never happenagain

Time: Immediate action

Risk Low/medium

Benefit: Reducepublicconcernand restore/preservestability

Health and Safety

ResponseAction:

- Declared emergency in near vicinity of military hospitals/crowd control by police
- Announcethe emergencysituationisstill active.
- Showmedicalsupportfor countries#2 and #3.

Time: Emergencysituation/toppriority

<u>Risk</u> To minimize the risk by usingair ambulance having all the equipment including ventilator for critical patients along with a medical team.

Benefit: Minimize risk of losingvictims; and life saving of patients.

Legal Panel

ResponseAction:

- Start buildinga legal caseabout the cable damage Country 3 stated that it hasevidencethat it was damaged by another dark vessel
- Record all ship tracking data (Automatic Identification System), photos,andfindingsaboutthe damagearea.
- Keep a formal report about the discoveryof underwater glider but don'tdamageanyoneyet.
- Memorandumof understandingon the use of the software to country #3 and#2

Legal Panel Continued

<u>Time:</u> Immediateaction

Benefit:

- Canhelpin the future or gettingcompensation blame is proven
- Buildsour caseand protects our legal position
- Keepsthe door open for dialogueand helpsus stay credible

Final Decisions

- 1. Monitor hostagesituationand coordinateif needed
- 2. Overseesafecablerepair and review gliderfindings
- 3. Finalizelegaldocumentation for future arbitration
- 4. Implement conditional MDA agreement
- 5. Beginconsultations for regional maritime cooperation initiative

Strategic Messages

- <u>To international Community</u>. We remain committed to peaceful resolution, regional stability and protection of all civilians and infrastructure
- <u>To technology partners</u> We welcome support that respects out sovereignty, ensure transparency and strengthen independent maritime capabilities
- <u>To domesticstakeholders</u> Your safety, infrastructure and economy are out highest priority. We are taking careful sovereign steps in response to this crisis


Country 2




April 22-25th 2025

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cenario 1: Armed Robbery at ea	Scenario 2: Hostages Taken on Passenger Ferry, \$ 7.5 million Ransom	Scenario 3: Cable Cutting and Ocean Glider
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Assessment:

- 1. Glider discovery threatens diplomatic relations with country 1.
- Hostage crisis & infrastructure sabotage might shift suspicion to us if not properly addressed.

Recommendation:

- 1. Issue official statement confirming the nonmilitary nature of the glider with technical documentation.
- 2. Offer full cooperation & transparency to country 1 regarding glider records.
- 3. Propose joint investigation for the incident.
- 4. Avoid aggressive rhetoric.
- 5. Maintain force readiness to intervene for hostage rescue.

Update 3 Timeline and Assessment:

Ferry Company Plans to Provide Ransom and End Regional Route		2, and 3's navies are I in the region		Foreign Secretary A Software Package
<				
Assessment:	- h o t o v o	Recommendation: 1. In tactical/OPS le	evel, establish rules o	f engagement/deconflic

- Geo-politically country 3 denied sabotage involvement/ exclude our country accessing the new regional maritime domain awareness software ->signaling political
- distrust or strategic isolation.
 Breakdown law enforcement's ability to act unilaterally/ potential loss of faith in our state capacity to protect civilian assets/ Incentivization.
- 3. Naval Presence in the area>Create high risk of accident & confrontation ->Urgent need for clarity, control and coordination.
- In tactical/OPS level, establish rules of engagement/deconfliction protocols/enhancement maritime Intel capabilities./prepare for civilian rescue and protection.
- Diplomatic-Political level Counter political isolation by calling urgent regional maritime security/publicly affirm our country's commitment to FON, regional security and hostage recovery/challenge hostage payment legally by highlighting the danger of normalizing private ransom settlement/try legally to prevent or delay ransom payment.
 STRATCOM- issue public statement reiterating non -involvement
- STRATCOM- issue public statement reiterating non involvement in sabotage, condemning privacy, call for regional unity/launch media outreach to highlight our county rescue effort & humanitarian commitment IOT counteract country 3 attempt to marginalize us.

Summary

Diplomatic	\odot	Information	\odot	Military	\odot	Economic	\odot
Working within regional and multilateral instituti and facilitate region leadership.		Use all forms of communications to communicate protect the natio interests. Offer a capabilities to al regional partner financial cost.	s in order and onal all MDA Il willing	Position force and secure m security inclu- initiation of st combined tas open to all reg actors who ar	aritime ding eps for k force gional	Ensure region commerce and provide protec ensure freedo navigation.	d ction to



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