2026 Report

Indo-Pacific Maritime Dialogue: "Maritime Security, Emerging Tools, and Enhanced Coordination"

Led by the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies in cooperation with the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies and the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

14-16 September 2026
Location: Lebua at State Tower, Bangkok, Thailand
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

From 14-16 September, the Near East South Asia (NESA) Center for Strategic Studies, in cooperation with the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (WJPC) and the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (DKI APCSS) conducted the 2026 Indo-Pacific Maritime Dialogue in Bangkok, Thailand. Seventy-nine participants from government institutions and the private sector representing the Western Pacific, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Eastern Africa, the Middle East, and the Western Hemisphere took part. Participating government institutions included navies, coast guards, port authorities, foreign affairs ministries, and national law enforcement agencies. Seventeen private-sector entities took part representing the following sectors: autonomous systems, artificial intelligence, sensing, infrastructure and port

development, cybersecurity providers, satellite imagery, and undersea cable maintenance and protection.

Key accomplishments and policy recommendations are detailed in the report below, but primary takeaways include the following:

- The potential for a cross-regional maritime security community of interest substantial. Participants valued comparing experiences from different parts of the world to identify common threats, distinct regional challenges, and effective responses. NESA intends to continue this effort with U.S. and international partners.
- Private-sector stakeholders cannot solve every maritime problem, or replace the responsibilities and experiences of navies, coast guards and maritime law enforcement. Yet, organizations, technology firms, shipping companies, insurers, and other commercial actors are essential maritime security stakeholders. Governments should narrow the longstanding divide between public- and private-sector efforts in the maritime domain.
- When feasible, future programs should incorporate more complex and focused tabletop exercises that connect strategic, operational, and tactical considerations.
- Future iterations should give international partners a greater role in shaping and leading program content. Their experience with distinct combinations of maritime challenges and locally developed solutions can enrich the broader community.
- Gray-zone and asymmetric threats are likely to become more common. Whether the sponsor is a state or non-state actor, effective responses require broader experience, better data, and practical, affordable, and transferable solutions.
- The underwater domain is an increasingly important source of maritime risk. Protecting subsea cables and managing seabed mining and mineral exploration are rising priorities, particularly for island states and countries with large exclusive economic zones. Participants called for greater investment in international dialogue, training, and professional exchanges on underwater domain awareness.

KEY FINDINGS/INSIGHTS:

The event brought together a transregional collection of participants, experts, and private sector innovators. The following findings reflect the principal insights gathered during the engagement.

- **Cross-regional maritime gatherings provide significant value.** Multiple participants emphasized the benefit of hearing different perspectives on comparable. Practices such as IUU fishing and unauthorized survey or research-vessel activity may be new to some states but familiar to others. Sharing best practices and building professional networks can strengthen responses across the global maritime domain.

- **Private-sector participation enriches the program.** Private-sector representatives provided insight into how emerging technologies and new forms of public-private collaboration are shaping maritime security efforts. Future programs should continue to include commercial actors, with partner nations helping identify the sectors and capabilities most relevant to their needs.

- **Gray-zone and asymmetric maritime threats are increasing, and maritime partnerships must adapt.** Diplomacy and regional forums such as ASEAN, the African Union, and the Indian Ocean Rim Association have important roles, but security practitioners also need trusted channels for discussing vulnerabilities with like-minded partners. Future programs should examine legal authorities and case completion, joint patrols and Shiprider agreements, and practical ways to strengthen existing cooperation.

- **Underwater domain awareness will become increasingly important to all maritime actors.** Undersea cable governance is a logical starting point because it already commands substantial international attention. Regional states face competing technology, financing, and consortium models associated with China and Western partners. Governments must consider ownership, maintenance access, data security, repair capacity, and political leverage, not simply construction cost. Integrating this into policy discussions can also support broader information sharing and cooperation on seabed governance and the protection of marine resources within exclusive economic zones.

- **Collaboration to acquire, jointly manufacture, or standardize sensors is expanding as a form of national protection and maritime cooperation.** These must reconcile security requirements with national economic interests, private-sector capabilities, legal authorities, and acquisition and deployment costs. Renewed interest in strengthening defense industrial bases and diversifying supply chains may create opportunities for cooperation, particularly on commercial dual-use sensors.

- **Participants highlighted the need for similar programs like this one but focused on other regional waters**, including West Asia, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere.

- **Discussions on commercial imagery and shipping information demonstrated how rapidly the maritime-data ecosystem is expanding**. Commercial satellite providers can archive large volumes of imagery, offer self-service access for smaller purchases, and reduce the interval between collection and delivery. The discussion indicated that access models vary by contract: some products can be broadly shared among users of a platform, while other agreements restrict onward distribution. This makes contractual and governance arrangements as important as technical collection capability.
  Participants repeatedly questioned data confidence, ethical obligations, dual-use applications, and the private sector's role in national security. Concerns included the reliability of maritime reporting near contested areas. The discussion suggested that the central challenge is increasingly how to validate, combine, and interpret multiple data sources rather than how to obtain any data at all.

- **Participants favored complementing classroom instruction with practical demonstrations**. Options include site visits to host-country maritime security institutions, provider demonstrations of how their tools function, and case study lessons briefed to all participants. Participants also expressed particular interest in demonstrations of unmanned systems applicable to the maritime domain.

RECOMMENDATIONS/ACCOMPLISHMENTS:

- **Rotate the "show"** among regions and maritime environments. Future iterations should include additional private-sector and provide more opportunities for regional states to brief their experiences to the wider plenary. The organizers are considering options to respond to this recommendation.
    - Participants also recommended establishing an advanced course that examines operational details and technical requirements in greater depth for alumni of existing maritime-focused programs.

- **Sustain momentum within this maritime community of interest**. Future presentations and tabletop exercises should bring together a wider range of stakeholders to identify cross-regional collaboration opportunities, improve maritime domain awareness, explore even joint training, and strengthen public-private partnerships. This iteration of the program added sixty-one new members to NESA's alumni network.

- **Vietnam seeks to retool their maritime confrontation against the PRC.** Several prominent Vietnamese firms associated with coastal infrastructure and the communications sector took part. Beyond pursuing deals with trusted providers of technology and military/security vehicles, the firms are working with Vietnamese state ministries to retool their domestic fishing fleet to be able to better hassle, confront, and resist Chinese aggression. These include physical alterations to the commercial fishing vessels, altered association with state regulations, and enhanced communication. Deeper requests for information should be relayed separately to NESA POC.

- **Maritime information-sharing practices require improvement.** Options include expanding fusion centers to do more or expand their liaison officer uses (Singapore, India, Madagascar, etc.), strengthening support for SeaVision, IORIS, and other MDA tools and bring them to more partners, and linking efforts at information sharing to existing cross-regional forums (multilateral or bilateral exercises, the Quad, ASEAN, IONS, etc.). All the aforementioned options are wise, but this program detailed the importance of information sharing in a modular fashion, meaning to have an accepted forum or pathway through which much data can be used by many stakeholders. Developing trusted government-government pathways will require sustained attention but the theme of the chasm between public and private stakeholders emerges again when it comes to information sharing. That divide must be bridged better with modular pathways that all can access and potentially contribute to. Building that bridge is a longer effort but one this community will focus on in greater detail.

***2026 AGENDA*:**

DESCRIPTION/CONCEPT:

The Indo-Pacific can be defined in multiple ways, but one feature that is always present no matter what the overarching construct is that this region is shaped by its waters. The maritime domain is the source of much of the Indo-Pacific's material wealth, diplomatic energy, and even its regional disputes. Commentary on the region's waters disproportionately do not dive deep enough into the process of maritime security nor naval operations. Analysis tends to move the global commons into the subsection of overall "regional security." This event will dive into details related to the state of the maritime domain and its connections to other domains. The surface, the subsurface, the littoral zones, airspace above our waters, and the orbital zones above our planet will be elements of our conversations. We shall explore tools for greater information sharing, methods of enhancing capabilities, partnerships that are defining contemporary maritime security, the impact of technological innovation, and scan the horizon towards what we are approaching. Strategic issues will be discussed, but this event is tied to the components that define maritime policy and maritime operations. Most importantly, this event seeks to accomplish one thing above all others – provide a means for translating between the industries, infrastructure, operations, and politics that impact maritime security.

The event is a Track 1.5 effort, where official representatives from regional governments will join subject matter experts, scientists, commercial firms, technology companies, and strategists. The event follows the Chatham House rule of non-attribution. The event will feature modules where experts will demonstrate perspectives, tools, and methods for enhancing maritime security. These modules will be accompanied by tabletop exercise sessions. Following the event, the organizers will craft a report of the event's proceedings and its findings that will be shared with all participants and cooperating institutions.

NOTE: All conversations adhere to the Chatham House rule of non-attribution. Acknowledgement of the event will come in the form of a written report with no names, countries, or institutions being identified. Participants are allowed to self-identify as taking part, but no attribution of any remarks by an actor is permitted nor identification of any institution or nation state is permitted.

Sunday, 13 September

AM/PM	Foreign/Non-Local Participants Arrive in Bangkok; Check-In at Hotel
PM	Foreign/Non-Local Participants Requested to Arrive by 2000 on the 13th

Monday, 14 September

0700-0830	Breakfast at Leisure (for Foreign/Non-Local Participants)
0900-0915	Welcome Speaker: Jeffrey Payne, Associate Professor, NESA

0915 – 0930 Introductions

0930 – 1015 Module 1: Information and Data – the World of MDA

1015 – 1100 Module 2: Command, Challenges, and Horizon Scan

1100 – 1130 Coffee/Tea Break

1130 – 1215 Module 3: Information Sharing – SeaVision and M.S.S.I.S.

1215 – 1300 Module 4: Information Layers and Tools

1300 – 1400 Lunch

1400 – 1445 Module 5: Commercial Shipping Stakeholders

1445 – 1530 Module 6: Underwater Domain Awareness

1530 – 1545 Coffee/Tea Break

1545 – 1630 Module 7: Western Hemisphere MARSEC

1630 – 1630 Tabletop Exercise Briefing

1630 – 1730 Tabletop Exercise Session 1
Group 1:
Group 2:
Group 3:

1730 Conclusion of Day 1

Tuesday, 15 September

0700 – 0830 Breakfast at Leisure (for Foreign/Non-Local Participants)

0900 – 0905 Announcements
Speaker:
Jeffrey Payne, Associate Professor, NESA

0905 – 0950 Module 8: Pacific Considerations

0950 – 1035 Module 9: Case in Depth – West Philippines Sea

1035 – 1100 Coffee/Tea Break

1100 – 1215 Tabletop Exercise Session 2

1215 – 1330 Lunch

1330 – 1415 Module 10: Case in Depth – the Taiwan Strait

1415 – 1500 Module 11: Case in Depth – the Eastern IOR

1500 – 1545 Coffee/Tea Break

1545 – 1630 Module 13: Cyber Tools and Maritime Law Enforcement

1630 – 1715 Module 14: Commercial Data and MDA

1715 Conclusion of Day 2

1800 – 1930 Alumni Reception
Location: Floor M, 1st Level Conference Space
Attendees: Participants and NESA Alumni

Wednesday, 16 September

0700-0830 Breakfast at Leisure (for Foreign/Non-Local Participants)

0900-0905 Announcements
Speaker:
Jeffrey Payne, Associate Professor, NESA

0905 – 1005 Tabletop Exercise Session 3

1005 – 1030 Coffee/Tea Break

1030 – 1115 Module 15: Maritime Infrastructure Power

1115 – 1200 Module 16: Maritime Governance and Technology

1200 – 1300 Lunch

1300 – 1345 Module 17: MARSEC and Subsea Cables/Critical Underwater Infrastructure

1345 – 1430 Module 18: Autonomy for Maritime Domain Awareness

1430 – 1545 Special Module: The Maritime Domain, Industry and COTS

1545 – 1600 Coffee/Tea Break

1600 – 1630 Tabletop Exercise Session 4 (Conclude Slide Deck)

1630 – 1700 Exercise Results
Speakers:
- Group 1 Presentation
- Group 2 Presentation
- Group 3 Presentation

1700 – 1715 Farewells

TABLETOP EXERCISE:

The following scenario is built upon real world examples of maritime challenges, and you are charged with reaching a set of recommendations that represent the consensus of your group. These recommendations can be diplomatic, informational, economic, legal, military, or technological in nature.

Initial Instructions:

Each of you is assigned to one of three breakout groups. Each group will have a moderator that will assist in answering questions and facilitating the conversations to be held. Each group represents senior leaders of their respective countries brought together by the Chief Executive of their respective states to navigate a set of maritime challenges that have emerged in the region.

Your first task is to assign two roles among the group. Each group must have a rapporteur who will track the discussions and build the PowerPoint slides that will be shared to the larger plenary at the end of the event. Each group must also elect a spokesperson/representative who will present the group's conclusions to the larger plenary.

Background:

After these roles are determined, your group will begin discussion of the maritime security scenario you face. Each group will represent a distinct mythical country (inspired by a medley of real-world examples). Each of your countries is in the same geographic region (i.e., you are all neighbors).

- Major Non-Regional Power – Represented by Jeff Payne who will float amongst rooms.
- All regional countries are part of a multilateral organization that seeks to ensure stability and prosperity for the region. Aldhani, Dantooine, and Brendock are each invested in the organization. The remainder of the countries, while members, do not play a major role. Outside the region, the organization is seen as largely ineffective.
- Non-Represented Regional Countries:
    - Brendock – the smallest country in the region that has historically sought to resist the influence and potential intent to annex the country by neighboring Ghorman. It is a monarchy and most of the population lives near poverty with a small elite population enjoying immense wealth.

- Narkina – is widely known as the region's most problematic state due to constant internal conflict. It is the poorest nation in the region that is currently ruled by the military that is affiliated with the country's smallest ethnic group. Considerable parts of the country are de facto governed by separatist groups.
- Aldhani – spends most of its time seeking to keep the instability in Narkina out of its territory. It is a struggling democracy that is growing economically due to the discovery of substantial offshore natural gas deposits.

- Group 1: You hail from the country of Dantooine.
  - Dantooine is the region's most prosperous nation by per capita gross domestic product. The economy is built upon information/technology services, finance/banking, and international trade. The country has the region's largest and busiest commercial port. Dantooine is known for its maritime capabilities.
  - Dantooine is a democracy with a free press in a parliamentary system. It has a highly professionalized, if small, bureaucratic structure organized around ministries.
  - Dantooine is also the second smallest country in the region in geographic size and population, with most of the population living in the capital city.
  - Dantooine's security forces are defined as its national police force and armed forces. The national police force is the largest contingent by number of personnel and covers the responsibilities of domestic security, coast guard, criminal investigations, infrastructure security, and protection of the population. The armed forces are made up of an air force, navy, and national guard. The armed forces are highly advanced and possess impressive capabilities across domains, but do not possess the scale of neighboring states.
  - Dantooine prides itself on its diplomacy and is known globally as a convener for various international conclaves and negotiations. The country actively engages with its neighbors and seeks to avoid regional conflicts. Dantooine also enjoys positive relationships with the world's most dominant powers (who are external to the region).
  - The country lacks natural resource wealth and relies heavily upon imports for its food, fuel, and other raw materials.
  - While a wealthy nation-state, Dantooine does not possess an inherent national identity, having been formed through a confederation process among indigenous groups following colonialism by a non-regional power.

- Group 2: You hail from the country of Ghorman.
  - Ghorman is the region's largest country by land mass and population. It possesses a strong national identity as it was the only country in the region that was never colonized by a foreign power.
  - Ghorman's per capita gross domestic product is the second lowest in the region and its primary industries are mining, agriculture, and simple manufacturing. It enjoys substantial natural resource wealth, but much of it has yet to be accessed. The country is rural as its economy has not facilitated substantial urbanization.
  - The governmental structure is authoritarian, represented by a single political party that has ruled the country for a century. Due to its size and military power, it sees

itself as the rightful lead power in the region. It has historically sought to heavily influence, if not outrightly annex, neighboring Brendock. It is the only regional state with strong relations with the Narkina government.
    - Ghorman has the region's largest security structure. Its largest security unit by numbers is the national police force responsible for all law enforcement, political investigations, and sustaining the government's rule. The military is the region's largest and is represented by four branches (army, navy, air force, and cyber). While not as technological advanced as nearby Dantooine, Ghorman's military scale outmatches the entire region. Historically, Ghorman is a rival of Ferrix and won a war against it that ended 50 years ago, though they currently enjoy stable relations. Ghorman has a history as a maritime power, but it is the most terrestrially focused state in the region.

- Group 3: You hail from the country of Ferrix.
    - Ferrix was once the region's dominant power and at one time went to war against Narkina and Ghorman. Ferrix lost its war against Ghorman and remains suspicious of Ghorman's regional aspirations. It is strongly unified country with strong nationalist expressions amongst its population.
    - Ferrix has a balanced economy and is the second wealthiest in the region by per capita GDP. Its economy is balanced between services, manufacturing, and natural resource mining and refinement. The country is highly urbanized and is the most visited regional country by tourists. The country was once a colony of a non-regional power, but it emerged, like Dantooine, from colonialism with specific advantages that facilitated political stability and economic growth.
    - Ferrix has the region's second largest military (though still outmatched by Ghorman's scale). The military has four branches – navy, air force, army, and special operations. The military has a particular focus on special operations – counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, non-traditional warfare, etc. – due to the instability within neighboring Narkina and its tensions with Ghorman. Ferrix's national law enforcement services are small and highly specialized due to many traditional law enforcement responsibilities being led by provincial governments.
    - Ferrix is a federated democratic system – the national government dominates specific responsibilities, but substantial governance is exercised by provincial leaders.
    - Diplomatically, Ferrix closely cooperates with non-regional democratic countries and aims to reclaim past regional influence. Ferrix enjoys a diversified maritime base and is heavily involved in maritime governance, maritime security collaboration, and the maritime economy.

SCENARIO, PART I:
NOTE: Each Group is NOT Allowed to Engage with Each Other.

Early in the morning of the 1 August, a separatist group in Narkina announced that it had control over a sizeable portion of Narkina's western coast and demanded recognition as a new state. This separatist group has an ad hoc navy/coast guard and has claimed Narkina's western territorial waters and EEZ as its own. The Narkina government rejected the validity of the separatist group

claim with a claim of its own – that Ferrix and Brendock are providing support to this group. Dantooine called for a regional summit for conversations. Ghorman signaled ongoing support for the Narkina government.

On 15 August, a Dantooine flagged cargo vessel on its way to a Ferrix port was struck by two unmanned aerial vehicles. There were two casualties on board and the vessel's engines failed. Dantooine deployed a naval vessel to the location of the attack (just outside the territorial waters claimed by the separatist group) and a vessel to tow the attacked container ship to a nearby port in Aldhani. No actor took responsibility for the attack.

From 28-30 August, a planned major maritime and littoral joint military exercise took place in Ferrix. Only Dantooine was invited to participate in a limited fashion with most participating foreign units hailing from Ferrix's non-regional partners. The exercise focused on maritime domain awareness, countering EEZ penetration and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, disaster response, and ISR capabilities. Immediately after the exercise, Ferrix's foreign partners announced the finalization of an agreement to repair and resupply their military vessels in two Ferrix ports. Ferrix also announced a massive investment in their domestic industrial base with their foreign partners focused on core defense equipment manufacturing and drone part manufacturing.

Starting in mid-August, commercial fisherman from both Ferrix and Ghorman have reported routinely encountering what they claim are foreign fishing fleets inside their country's EEZ. Some of the reports claiming to pass close by the vessels claimed to hear the crew speaking Narkina language. A few Ferrix fishing vessels have claimed that while the foreigners were sailing fishing vessels, they were not engaged in fishing – in fact, they claim that the vessels were simply lingering.

Starting on 1 September, shipping companies operating throughout the region began to avoid sailing near the Narkina western coast. This was done in relation to worries over the drone strike and rising insurance costs for operating near the Narkina coast.

On 3 September, a container ship was encountered by an Aldhani coast guard vessel inside their territorial waters. The container ship was loitering. The vessel was boarded and an inspection discovered inside some of the containers a collection of aerial drones and small arms. The vessel was registered with a Ferrix corporation. The vessel was seized and the crew arrested on suspicion of arms trafficking. Ghorman announced alarm over Ferrix engaging in trafficking. Ferrix stated that the vessel was clearly criminal and will seek legal action against the owners of the vessel.

As a crisis response group for each of your countries, please discuss what the proper response should be to these incidents – what should be prioritized, what maritime actions should be taken, or even what political actions should be pursued. Be as precise and detailed as you can in your conclusions and remember that your group should aim for consensus.

SCENARIO, PART II:
NOTE: Each Group IS Allowed to Consult with Each Other but can only Send One Representatives at a Time to Talk with Your Neighbors. It is RECOMMENDED that you determine ahead of time what to share and what to request from your neighbors ahead of sending representatives.

A non-regional power that is active diplomatically and economically with most of the region and is an observer within the regional multilateral organization recommended that the region should institutionalize a way to share information regarding the maritime domain or create a center that can collect data from the region, analyze it, and then share it.

Over the past week, there have been a series of confrontations between Ferrix commercial fisherman and accused Narkina fishing vessels that are within the Ferrix EEZ. Ferrix media outlets are reporting, though unconfirmed by any government source, that the suspected Narkina illegal fisherman are being directed by the Narkina government on behalf of Ghorman. The aim is to strain Ferrix resources and security assets.

Add these new developments into your deliberations and decision making.

SCENARIO PART III:
NOTE: Each Group IS Allowed to Consult with Each Other but can only Send One Representatives at a Time to Talk with Your Neighbors.

On 9 September, Ferrix announced the recovery of an unmanned surface vehicle just one kilometer off its coast that was clearly built and operated by Ghorman. Ghorman has yet to comment.

A collection of private firms engaged in maritime security that hail from a major non-regional power that has deep relations with Ferrix and Dantooine has offered what they claim is a solution for an escalating problem set. The collection of firms includes a major shipping company, a satellite imagery company, an artificial intelligence firm specializing in visual classification, and several firms that manufacture specialized sensors for the maritime domain. This collection proposes the region purchase licensing for a private sector-facilitated maritime domain awareness system that can assist each country with enhancing their information collection and further regional collaboration. The foreign government where these firms are headquartered has been signaling their support of this initiative through its embassies. This government has pledged to subsize the cost of the license for using the system for a period of 4 years.


Add these new developments into your deliberations and decision making. Begin finalizing your presentation and slides.


MAP:


THE REGION
Ferrix
Narkina
Ghorman
Aldhani
Dantooine
Brendock

PRESENTATIONS:

Group 1: Dantooine





DANTOOINE MARITIME COUNCIL

2 // Information Access Decision

GROUP 1 // EYES ONLY FOR THE SENATE CANTINA

DECISION

Buy the signal, not the strategic mortgage.

We propose regionally-driven solutions to information acquisition and sharing. Rather than relying on non-regional leadership, self-funded access to the information system better preserves autonomy.

WHAT WE DO INSTEAD

- **Self-fund access to the information system or an equivalent capability.**
- Feed the information picture directly into the multilateral forum.
- Share useful maritime indicators while preserving national judgement.
- Avoid port-access, manufacturing-support or economic-concession dependencies.
- Accept the cost burden as the price of staying strategically autonomous.



NO SUBSIDISED LEASH

Self-funded access lets us share evidence without making the forum look like a proxy project.

Decision point | Reject discounted dependency; fund access; share through the forum

no lightsabers authorised

Presenter Notes
2026-09-22 21:57:28

Slide purpose: records the decision on the four-year subsidised information-access offer and the self-funded alternative.

[Sources]
- Strategic content derived from the user's Dantvain/Dantooine scenario updates provided in chat, including Scenario Parts III-IV on 16 September 2026.
- Prior deck structure and recurring visual language derived from Dantooine_Maritime_Stabilisation_Brief.pptx found in the user's File Library.
- Visual backgrounds and crest were generated by OpenAI image generation during this chat; no external source assets were used.

DANTOOINE MARITIME COUNCIL

3 // Forum & Fusion-Centre Pathway

GROUP 1 // EYES ONLY FOR THE SENATE CANTINA

CONTROLLED TRANSPARENCY

Own the access. Share the picture.

The fusion-centre concept works if it produces a shared evidence picture, rather than makes us beholden to outside interest. Participation can be broad; control of analysis and tasking must stay bounded.

OPERATING FLOW

SELF-FUND	→	FUSION CELL	→	FORUM	→	OPTIONS
information access		maritime data + liaison		shared evidence picture		law enforcement / escort / sanctions

NEGOTIATING LINE

Non-regional powers can observe, support and provide technical inputs — but Dantooine should not trade concessional access for policy alignment.



Architecture | Universal forum, bounded fusion cell, no operational veto

no lightsabers authorised

Presenter Notes
2026-09-22 21:57:28

Slide purpose: sets out the revised fusion-centre pathway after the decision to self-fund access and share outputs into a multilateral forum.

[Sources]
- Strategic content derived from the user's Dantvain/Dantooine scenario updates provided in chat, including Scenario Parts III-IV on 16 September 2026.
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DANTOOINE MARITIME COUNCIL

4 // Dantooine Summit Proposal

GROUP 1 // EYES ONLY FOR THE SENATE CANTINA

RESPONSE TO GORMAN COUNTER -OFFER

Host the summit; widen the agenda.

Gorman proposed a summit in Gorman with the Nakina government and Nakina separatists represented. Our position remains that the summit should be hosted in Dantooine.

TWO-TRACK DESIGN

SECURITY TRACK


Vessel attack, drone incidents, maritime security, fusion-centre rules, de-escalation and evidence handling.

PROSPERITY TRACK

Trade continuity, port/logistics resilience, sanctions impacts, financial support and region-wide economic upside.

OPEN ISSUE

Nakina separatist representation is not yet settled: decide the format only after testing security risk, legitimacy and whether representation helps or derails the summit.



Security gets them in the room; prosperity keeps them there.

Summit line | Dantooine hosts; two-track agenda; separatist format held open

no lightsabers authorised

Presenter Notes
2026-09-22 21:57:29

Slide purpose: captures the Gorman counter-offer and the revised Dantooine-hosted two-track summit position.

[Sources]
- Strategic content derived from the user's Dantwain/Dantooine scenario updates provided in chat, including Scenario Parts III-IV on 16 September 2026.
- Prior deck structure and recurring visual language derived from Dantooine_Maritime_Stabilisation_Brief.pptx found in the user's File Library.
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CRISIS RESPONSE GROUP 2

Country of Ghorman

Maritime Crisis Tabletop Strategy & Consensus Plan

September 2026 | Senior Leadership Assessment

PMESII-PT ACTOR MATRIX


P Political | M Military | E Economic | S Social | I Information | I Infrastructure | P Physical Environment | T Time

ACTOR	P	M	E	S	I	I	P	T
DANTOOINE	Parliamentary democracy; active diplomacy	Small, advanced joint force; strong maritime capability	Region's richest; IT, finance, trade; import-dependent	Small, urban; mixed post-colonial identity	Free press; convening influence	Major commercial port; strong services base	Small territory; capital-centric	Advanced capabilities; tech-based economy
GHORMAN	Authoritarian; single-party rule; regional leadership claim	Region's largest force; strong police; maritime power	Low per-capita GDP; mining, agriculture, manufacturing; untapped resources	Large, rural; strong national identity	State-centered political/security control	Large security structure; resource base	Largest state; broad territorial focus	Less advanced than Dantooine; cyber branch
FERRIX	Federated democracy; strong provincial governance	Second-largest military; strong SOF; maritime security focus	Second-richest; diversified services, industry, resources, tourism	Highly urbanized; strong nationalism	Close ties with non-regional democracies; regional influence	Diversified maritime base; ports support military partners	Regional state; maritime-oriented	Defense industry investment; drones; capable military tech
Narkina	Military rule; weak state control; separatist challenge	Military + separatist navy/coast guard; fragmented control	Poorest state; instability constrains economy	Ethnic minority rules; persistent internal conflict	Competing government/separatist narratives	Western coast partly under separatist control	Contested western coast and EEZ	Separatists field drones; capability details limited
Aldhani	Struggling democracy; active regional organization member	Coast guard active; naval capability shown	Growing economy; offshore natural gas	Political system under economic transition	Regional diplomatic participation	Coast guard; port access; offshore energy base	Archipelagic/coastal position near Narkina	Inspection/security capability; details limited
Brendock*	Monarchy; resists Ghorman influence/annexation	Capabilities not specified	Smallest state; widespread poverty; wealthy elite	High inequality; population near poverty	Likely vulnerable to external influence	Limited capacity implied by size/wealth	Small island state	Not specified
Narkina Separatists	Seek recognition and territorial control	Own navy/coast guard; control western coast/EEZ claim	Economic base not specified	Rooted in Narkina's internal/ethnic conflict	Statehood claim; coercive signaling	Control coastal areas and maritime access	Western Narkina + claimed territorial waters/EEZ	Use/possess drones; possible unmanned strike relevance
Major Non-Regional Power	External power; role in regional balance	Military support potential implied	External economic influence not detailed	No regional social base specified	Influence through partners/relationships	External access via regional partners	Outside region	Potential advanced capabilities; specifics not provided

Scenariol, II & III- Chronologicalevent register

✓ Maritime Security scalation and regional response

ID	DATE	ACTORS	EVENT EFFECT
1	1Aug	Narkina / Separatists / Ferrix/ Brendock / Dantooine / **Ghorman**	Separatist territorial claim; diplomatic positions harden.
2	15Aug	Dantooine / **Unknown actor**	UAV strike disables Dantooine-flagged cargo vessel; naval response follows.
3	Mid-Aug	Ferrix/ **Ghorman** / Alleged Narkina-linked vessels	Suspected foreign fishing/loitering activity reported inside EEZs.
4	28-30 Aug	Ferrix/ Dantooine / Non-regional partners	Major maritime-littoral exercise focused on MDA, IUU fishing, disaster response and ISR.
5	After exercise	Ferrix/ Non-regional partners	Port repair/resupply agreement and defense/drone manufacturing investment announced.
6	1Sep	Commercial shipping sector	Shipping avoids western Narkina coast; insurance/operating costs rise.
7	3 Sep	Aldhani / Ferrix/ **Ghorman**	Ferrix-registered ship seized; drones/small arms found; crew arrested; diplomatic reaction follows.
8	Unk date	Non-regional power / All regional actors	Advised sharing information IOT acquire MDA over the región.
9	Unk date (the past week)	Ferrix/ Narkina (allegedly on behalf of **Ghorman**)	Confrontations between Ferrix and Narkina. Narkina FV within FerrixEEZ.
10	9 Sep	Ferrix/ Allegedly **Ghorman**	Recovery of an USV, 1km off Ferrix coastal Waters, allegedly Ghorman USV.





Group 3: Ferrix

NESA CENTER · REGIONAL MARITIME SECURITY TABLETOP EXERCISE

Ferrix National Perspective

Courses of Action in Support of Regional Stability

September 2026

ORIENTATION

The Region



SIX STATES OF THE EXERCISE REGION

- **Ferrix** — *our delegation*
- **Narkina**
- **Ghorman**
- **Aldhani**
- **Dantooine**
- **Brendock**

STRATEGIC FRAMING

One Objective, Three National Priorities

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE

Regional Stability

Political stability preserves the trade and economic activity every state in this region depends on. Ferrix acts within the international rules-based order.

1 **National sovereignty**

Territorial integrity, EEZ rights and national decision-making remain non-negotiable.

2 **Economic stability**

Uninterrupted trade, secure sea lines of communication and protected fisheries.

3 **Maritime security**

Prioritised, with deliberate and purposeful planning to translate priority into practical measures and actions on the ground.

SITUATION OVERVIEW

Four Thematic Areas of Concern

Separatist tensions

Internal conflict in Narkina with potential to draw in external actors and destabilise the region.

Striking of cargo ship

Attack on commercial shipping threatening confidence in regional sea lines of communication.

Arms smuggling

Illicit weapons flows sustaining conflict actors and undermining law-enforcement control.

Illegal fishing (IUU)

Foreign fleets reported inside Ferrix and Ghorman EEZs; crews reportedly heard speaking Narkina.

PRIORITISATION: Score each area by assessed severity — the highest-scoring issues receive the most immediate attention.

SCENARIOS 1–2 · FERRIX APPROACH

Facts First, Region First, De-escalation First

Establish the facts

Investigate before acting. Reports (e.g. foreign fleets in the EEZ) may prove false — but if verified, the flag state must be held to account.

Identify root causes

Diagnose the key drivers of the conflict, then apply mitigation measures that preserve political stability.

Convene regional dialogue

Bring regional players to the table to agree the way forward. Regional issues are discussed regionally before any external third party is engaged.

De-escalate as first resort

Preserve existing relationships and avoid creating further adversaries while pursuing a sustainable solution.

RISK: Some states may decline to come to the table — undermining the purpose of a regional approach. Mitigate through sustained diplomacy and incentives to participate.

NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK

Three Levers, Applied in Sequence

Information

- Use the media to carry the Government narrative
- Define target audiences: domestic public, opposition, regional allies, adversaries, international community
- Correct false assumptions by releasing verified investigation findings

Diplomacy

- Engage regional partners directly to de-escalate tensions
- Selectively leverage non-regional partners' existing relationships with the adversary to influence sustainable solutions

Law Enforcement

- The backstop when information and diplomacy do not resolve the issue
- Provides credible next courses of action within a rules-based framework

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JOINT REGIONAL DISCUSSION · GROUPS 1–3

A Regional Maritime Fusion Centre

Maritime security first

The joint discussion agreed maritime security issues should be resolved first — a shared Fusion Centre is the practical mechanism to address these growing concerns and keep SLOC trade unimpeded.

Regionally owned

A regional IFC — not owned by any single state. Dantooine facilitates and offers to host.

Phased establishment

Stood up in stages, with member states embedded from across the region.

Data & information sharing

Sharing arrangements form part of the founding agreement from day one.

National buy-in first

Stakeholder engagement within each state is the essential precondition — national solidarity underpins a sustainable regional outlook.

SCENARIO 3

USV Recovered ~1 km Off the Ferrix Coast

1 · Investigate as coastal state

Establish the USV's origin, deployment location and purpose — who deployed it, its operational objectives, and whether it collected or transmitted data while in our waters.

2 · Engage regional partners

Inform Ghorman of the recovery and prioritise regional engagement to minimise any risk of escalation.

3 · Communicate deliberately

Apply the Information Paradigm: convey the Government's position and intended approach to local, regional and international audiences — and reassure the domestic public that the situation is managed and coordinated.

Clarity reduces uncertainty — at home, in the region, and internationally.

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EXTERNAL ENGAGEMENT

Non-Regional Partners: Value, With Safeguards

Offers of information-sharing platforms, free subscriptions and MDA capability bring real short-term advantages — provided three safeguards hold:

Protect national capability

Arrangements must not undermine our ability to build and maintain our own capabilities, capacity and institutions.

Avoid long-term dependency

Critical capabilities and services must not become reliant on foreign support.

Guard data sovereignty

Ownership, access, storage, use and security of shared data agreed clearly — before any formal arrangement.

INDEPENDENT DUE DILIGENCE

Assess each partner's interests objectively: who benefits, what strategic or commercial incentives are in play — noting defence-industry interests tied to procurement in periods of tension — and whether the arrangement serves the region's long-term interests. Evidence, not presumption.

POSITION STATEMENT

On the Separatist Question: Principled Neutrality

Respect sovereignty

The affected state addresses internal issues through its own national processes. Guided by the international rules-based order, we recognise and support the legitimate government.

Encourage dialogue

Constructive, peaceful and political engagement between the government and the separatist movement — internal conflicts left to escalate invite wider regional instability.

Remain neutral and consistent

Avoid any action that could be read as direct support to the separatists. Taking a side invites external actors to do the same.

THE RISK WE ARE AVOIDING: *alignment with either side could transform an internal conflict into a regional proxy conflict.*

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FERRIX PRIORITY ACTIONS

1 **Prioritise maritime security**

Deliberate, purposeful planning that turns priority into practical measures — anchored by the regional Fusion Centre.

2 **Investigate and verify**

Facts before assumptions in every incident — EEZ incursions, the cargo strike, the USV.

3 **Communicate the narrative**

Verified findings, defined audiences, timely domestic reassurance.

4 **Keep the region at the table**

Sustained dialogue and de-escalation; external partners engaged only with safeguards.

All priority actions serve one strategic objective:

Ferrix Delegation · Thank you — questions welcome

GROUP PHOTO:



NEAR EAST SOUTH ASIA

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