The Quad: Opportunities to Advance Shared Goals at the Crossroads of the Indo-Pacific

Executive Summary Report
10–12 July 2023

Sponsored by: Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, and Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
The Quad: Opportunities to Advance Shared Goals at the Crossroads of the Indo-Pacific

Report/Executive Summary
10–12 July 2023
Location: Singapore
Sponsors: NESA, DKI APCSS, RSIS
Leads: Jeffrey Payne, NESA Center and John Bradford, RSIS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

From 10–12 July, NESA and RSIS, along with its partner DKI APCSS, hosted an Indo-Pacific-themed program entitled “The Quad: Opportunities to Advance Shared Goals at the Crossroads of the Indo-Pacific.” The program featured 39 participants representing nineteen countries, most of whom hailed from the Bay of Bengal and ASEAN regions. Discussions occurred at the JEN Tanglin by Shangri La Hotel. Plenary sessions covered regional perspectives from the Bay of Bengal and ASEAN, technical elements of maritime security, technological innovation within the maritime sector, and perspectives on the health of cooperative institutions, among others. The participants also addressed a set of tabletop challenges designed to have them play the part of a community of interest engaged in regional maritime security.

This was the first Indo-Pacific engagement between these partners focusing on regional maritime security architecture. The Quad’s maritime dimensions, namely the IPMDA, were discussed in detail by participants. Comprehensively, the Quad’s maritime security contributions were not inherently opposed by regional states, but there remain concerns about the Quad’s potential impact on existing regional security architecture and regional stability. The report that follows details the program’s proceedings, its principal findings, and specific recommendations. Cooperation by the three institutions is planned to continue in the coming years.
**FINDINGS:**

- Despite progress, participants routinely pointed out that the Quad remains a political label that brings a death sentence to certain cooperative activities with some Indo-Pacific regional states. This avoidance of the Quad reflects both the sensitivities of regional states to a potential security role by the Quad and a pessimism that Quad activities will have sufficient clarity to be relied upon by regional states.

- There was tension between the Quad as a forum for deliverables (“regional solutions provided”) and a forum for discussion and coordination of national activities. There is the perception that the Quad States have tried to pursue both options. Sometimes they emphasize that it is delivering public goods (i.e., vaccines and IPMDA). At other times it seems to emphasize that it is a diplomatic/coordination effort.

- Regional participants suggested that proactive Quad activities were welcome in specific circumstances. “We’ll absolutely hate it. And we shall protest. But we know we need it.” The selection bias of the community taking part in this forum (constituted of security professionals and subject matter experts) is relevant, for security-focused communities in the Indo-Pacific will and do differ in perceptions to larger constituencies.

- Notions that regional hesitation about the Quad is related to China’s regional influence or regional concerns about tensions with China alone are overvalued. The region’s hesitation about the Quad is premised on national concerns, concerns emerging out of regional security/diplomatic architecture, regional perceptions about the long-term benefits of the Quad, and managing Chinese reactions.

- India’s role within the Quad and Delhi’s deepening engagement throughout the Indo-Pacific was noted by several participants. Not only is India warming up to deeper engagement with its fellow Quad partners, but it is also expanding its economic, diplomatic, and security cooperation efforts in the Indo-Pacific. The Quad as an indicator of India’s rise was noted.

- Regional participants noted that the Quad’s impact in the region and the political attention on this minilateral partnership is related to the deep and strengthening bilateral ties among each member state. India’s relationship with the United States is maturing, as witnessed this summer by Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Washington, DC (for example).

- The Quad’s stated intent to further regional cybersecurity and maritime capacity building, both areas of focus for many regional states, is indicative of why the Quad, despite regional cynicism, can have an impact.

- The IPMDA within the Quad has garnered some regional interest, but regional perceptions point to a concept that is underdeveloped and that is not easily understood. The necessity for the IPMDA to reveal an effort that addresses regional needs to prove its relevance has arrived.

- There were discussions about regional perceptions of the Quad versus real policy ideas. Perceptions that the Quad is underdeveloped or ‘messy’ in its outreach to the region
could be inaccurate, as the deliverables that have been stood up (Quad Investors Network, Covid Response/Relief, and so forth) show the Quad is more resilient an enterprise than often thought.

- Progress made by specific Quad actors in the Indo-Pacific does not receive the same attention when not under the ‘Quad Banner,’ even if directly relevant to the Quad’s aims. Case in point, overseas arms assistance by Japan is now accepted as a part of policy by Tokyo, a transformation from previous political consensus.

- The Quad’s regional political influence can overshadow regional-led security and economic cooperative efforts, as well as overshadow the activities of other non-regional actors in the Indo-Pacific. For instance, the activities of various European powers in the Pacific and (often overlooked) Indian Ocean Region are examples.

- What is the relevance of the Quad to the various Quad nation-states’ individual or non-Quad partnerships? Does India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative overlap with its Quad efforts? Does the trilateral relationship between the United States-Australia-United Kingdom inform the United States or Australia’s Quad investments? Participants noted that the region and its waters garner more attention than ever before. That attention has led to more efforts than in previous years. Yet, this focus on the region has helped to create a complex web of bilateral, minilateral, and multilateral efforts. What is the trend for all these efforts, the Quad included?

- Regional interest in the Quad and overall regional attention towards maritime challenges have expanded the number of requests for maritime law enforcement cooperation. Coast guards and maritime constabulary institutions seek to intensify cooperative efforts when feasible, which has created a demand for technical and legal training and cooperative operations. In turn, this has tested the depth of such institutions.

- Discussions asked variations of a direct question – is the Quad selling itself well in the region? Subsequent questions, such as does the Quad need to communicate more often or less intensely, were often asked.

- Could a Quad Maritime Investment Forum be a viable option – something new that does not replicate other efforts and allows more of a menu approach to possible IPMDA-related efforts?
RECOMMENDATIONS:

- The Quad facilitates the creation of a Maritime Governance Center for Excellence.

- The Quad’s coast guard and maritime law enforcement institutions coordinate amongst themselves more comprehensively and under the Quad banner to assist in domain awareness, HA/DR, and technical/legal training for regional partners.

- The Quad could serve as a regional incubator of efforts – from helping to mature organization/NGO activities, advance inter-organizational connections/joint efforts, and facilitate private and public sector experiments to advance maritime security and MDA.

- Quad States can mature existing cooperative efforts to help strengthen regional efforts that work to sustain established rules and norms. The Quad works to reinforce the established rules and norms of the Indo-Pacific, particularly in the maritime domain.

- Quad cooperation among its maritime services and private sector firms to design, build, and regionally provide a common low-tech cutter platform to enhance regional maritime capabilities. Such a platform would be easily modified for a variety of operations. This would be one way to quickly enhance regional capacity.

- The Quad, with its substantial technology sector, could work on facilitating commercial options for regional states in the space domain, as well as create a potential platform that assists with MDA transparency (possibly merging existing options between SeaVision and IORIS, among others). The creation of such a platform would be regionally controlled with the Quad states assisting in financing or connecting with financial streams.

- The Quad could be a convenor of various Track 1.5 regional discussions that discuss various public goods in the Indo-Pacific that the Quad has stated an interest in pursuing. Topics include emerging technology, coastal and digital infrastructure, HA/DR, and MDA. Quad states could provide both government representatives and financing for such efforts. The region already has a model for such efforts through both ASEAN and BIMSTEC.

- Quad-cooperative presentations, training courses, and demonstrations at regional expos, such as Singapore’s Maritime Week. The focus of such expos would be information sharing in an inclusive way and centered on benign objectives – such as safer, cleaner, and more sustainable ocean/marine environments. A focus on pollution would be an initial point of investment, with plastic as the first target for conversation. Conversations can expand to include the protection of fish stock. These expos would be ‘matchmaking’ opportunities between regional states, NGOs, the private sector, and local technology startups from the region.

- Improve regional communications efforts, specifically on what the Quad is and is not focused upon. Recognize that certain Quad member states are better suited as the communicator on certain projects, such as India in elements of MDA, Japan for digital and physical infrastructure, and so forth.
AGENDA:

The Quad: Opportunities to Advance Shared Goals at the Crossroads of the Indo-Pacific  
Sponsors: NESA, DKI APCSS, and RSIS  
10–12 July 2023  
JEN Singapore Tanglin by Shangri-La

DESCRIPTION:

Minilateral groupings, collections of like-minded states that cooperate in limited fashion for specific aims, are becoming increasingly common in our world. Some see it as a signal of the reshaping of the international order, others as a response to renewed efforts to undermine international rules and norms, and still more as a logical response to specific challenges that traditional policymaking is not attuned to address. Of these minilateral formations that have arisen, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or simply, the Quad) has gained more attention than most. Made up of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, the Quad is focused on the Indo Pacific region and has specific areas of interest – climate, global health, common security, and economic and infrastructural development. Yet, maritime security at the meeting point of the Indian and Pacific Oceans already has many existing structures led by regional states. What is the status of these existing institutions, groupings, and patterns? What role does the Quad have in seeking to enhance maritime security in this region?

This workshop brings together scholars, policymakers, and security experts to discuss the state of maritime security cooperation and effort in eastern reaches of the Indian Ocean and the western extremes of the Pacific Ocean. This is the focus of the event. Yet, the Quad as a concept garnering much attention will also be discussed in the context of the maritime pursuits and policies of regional littoral states. The Near East South Asia (NESA) Center for Strategic Studies, the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (DKI APCSS) and the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) are partners in this effort. The event features several plenary sessions, as well as breakout groups designed to diagnosis policy effectiveness, possible policy reforms/additions, and to evaluate what role the Quad can have in this portion of the Indo-Pacific. The event has an overt focus on maritime security and related issues.

ALL TIMES ARE SINGAPORE LOCAL
Participants who cannot attend in-person events, in select circumstances, can attend digitally.

Sunday, 9 July 2023
All Day Participants arrive in Singapore
Monday, 10 July 2023

0700–0845 Breakfast in Hotel

0900 Workshop Begins in Meeting Space (The Gallery, Floor 2)

0900–0915 Seminar Welcome
Speaker: 

- Dr. Sinderpal Singh, Senior Fellow, Assistant Director of Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University

0915–0930 Overview of Workshop
Speakers:

- Mr. Jeff Payne, NESA
- John Bradford, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies

0930–1115 1st Session: The Role of the Quad States in Indo-Pacific Maritime Security
This first session explores the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and the role its member states fulfill within larger maritime security efforts throughout the Bay of Bengal and the waters surrounding ASEAN.
Moderator: Dr. Ralf Emmers, SOAS, University of London
Speakers:

- Dr. Tanvi Madan, Brookings Institution
- Ambassador Masafumi Ishii, Former Ambassador of Japan to Indonesia
- Ambassador Clifford A. Hart, Jr., Bower Group Asia

1115–1130 Break

1130–1300 2nd Session: The Potential for Quad – ASEAN Maritime Support for Indo-Pacific Maritime Security
Our second session dives into how maritime security cooperation is perceived and pursued among ASEAN member states, along with ASEAN’s perceptions of the Indo-Pacific.
Moderator: Mr. John Bradford, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Speakers:

- Dr. Kei Koga, Nanyang Technological University
- Mr. Shahriman Lockman, ISIS Malaysia
- RADM (ret) Rommel Jude Ong, Professor of Praxis, Ateneo School of Government

1300–1400 Lunch
1400–1530  3rd Session: The Role of the Bay of Bengal/Eastern IOR Region in Indo-Pacific Maritime Security
The third session focuses on the eastern Indian Ocean, namely the Bay of Bengal and how regional states approach cooperative maritime security in the Bay of Bengal and throughout the larger Indo-Pacific. Moderator: Mr. Fahad Malaikah, NESA
Speakers:
- Mr. Abhijit Singh, Observer Research Foundation (Digital)
- Ms. Darshana Baruah, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Digital)
- Dr. Pramod Jaiswal, Nepal Institute for International Cooperation and Engagement (NIICE)

1530–1545 Break

1545–1645 Breakout 1
- Team 1: Quad States
- Team 2: Bay of Bengal/ASEAN States
- Team 3: Non-State Actors

1645–1715 NESA Logistics Consults (required of all participants)

1715 Conclusion of Day’s Events

Tuesday, 11 July 2023

0700–0845 Breakfast in Hotel

0900 Day 2 Begins

0900–0910 Breakdown of Day 1; Announcements

0910–1040 4th Session: Innovative Policy and Innovative Tools for MARSEC
This session emphasizes new perspectives and approaches that are emerging to further enhance regional maritime security. Moderator: Mr. John Bradford, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Speakers:
- Ms. Jane Chan, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
- Dr. John Hemmings, Pacific Forum
- Dr. Kasira Cheeppensook, Chulalongkorn University

1040–1110 Break

1110–1240 5th Session: Efficacy of Minilaterals and Multilateralism for MARSEC
The emergence of minilateral efforts and the current state of multilateralism within maritime security and regional cooperative efforts is explored in this session.

Moderator: CAPT Joshua Taylor, DKI ACPSS

Speakers:
- **Mr. Antoine Levesques**, The International Institute for Strategic Studies
- **Dr. Scott Edwards**, Yokosuka Council on Asia Pacific Studies
- **Dr. David Brewster**, Australia National University

1240–1400  Lunch

1400–1530  **6th Session: MARSEC Communication/Enhancing Information Sharing**

This session examines the importance of technological tools and technical elements supporting information sharing with maritime security.

Moderator: **Mr. Jeff Payne**, NESA

Speakers:
- **Dr. Jared Dunnmon**, Council on Foreign Relations and Defense Innovation Unit (Digital)
- **Mr. Charlie Brown**, Yokosuka Council on Asia Pacific Studies
- **Mr. John Bradford**, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies

1530–1545  Break

1545–1645  **Breakout 2**
- Team 1: Quad States
- Team 2: Bay of Bengal/ASEAN States
- Team 3: Non-State Actors

1645  **Conclusion of Day’s Events**

**Wednesday, 12 July 2023**

0700–0845  Breakfast in Hotel

0900  **Day 3 Begins**

0900–0910  **Breakdown of Day 2; Announcements**

0910–1040  **Breakout 3**
- Team 1
- Team 2
- Team 3

1040–1100  Break

1100–1230  **7th Session: Technical Realities in MARSEC Amidst Competition**
Our final formal session examines the realities of maritime security operations amidst a region that faces a larger strategic background of global competition. How can regional maritime security services and their partnering institutions move forward despite a more complex geopolitical environment?

Moderator: Mr. Fahad Malaikah, NESA

Speakers:

- Capt. Kentaro Furuya, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS)
- VADM Pradeep Chauhan, Director General, National Maritime Foundation
- Mr. Gilang Kembara, CSIS Indonesia

1230–1330  Lunch

1330–1415  8th Session: Breakout Team Results
Moderators: Mr. John Bradford, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies and Mr. Jeff Payne, NESA

Presentations:

- Team 1: Quad States
- Team 2: Bay of Bengal/ASEAN States
- Team 3: Non-State Actors

1415–1445  Final Discussion
Speakers:

- Mr. John Bradford, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
- Mr. Jeff Payne, NESA

1445  Conclusion of Workshop and Final Thanks
APPENDIX A:

Proposal: Indo-Pacific Maritime Governance Center of Excellence (COE)

MISSION:

- Enhance Indo-Pacific capacity to establish rules that underpin the good order at seas and enforce those rules in the face of state and non-state disruptors to advance regional prosperity.

PURPOSE:

- Build regional state capacity for maritime governance.
- Strengthen the rules-based maritime order by improving states’ capacity and issue awareness.

FUNCTIONS:

- Provide world-class education to maritime governance practitioners from across the Indo-Pacific.
- Conduct leading research on maritime security challenges and governance best practices.
- Develop a hub for persistent contact between the full range of maritime governance stakeholders including government, industry, and academia.
- Conduct public education on maritime governance topics.
- Serve as the leading repository of regional maritime governance knowledge.
- Create a network of cross-sector alumni and researchers with common understandings and shared experiences.
- Engage and facilitate multilateral maritime governance cooperation (HACGM, ASEANPOL, ReCAAP, etc.)
- Demonstrate cooperative resolve to address maritime governance.

SPONSORS (OPTIONS RANKED):

- Quad (1)
- AUS-Japan-US (2)
- Two of the three members of the AUS-JAPAN-US trilateral (3)
- Japan alone or Australia alone (4)
- US alone (5)
- UK, France, New Zealand, Canada, Germany & int’l organizations all welcome partners.
- More sponsors are generally better, but guard against early involvement of partners (sponsors & funders) with divergent interests that may erode unity of effort.
IDEAL HOST LOCATION (OPTIONS RANKED):

- Philippines (University of the Philippines, Manila) (1)
- Fiji (University of the South Pacific, Suva) (2)
- Indonesia (Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation) (3)
- Japan (GRIPS, Tokyo) or Australia (Darwin or ABF College, Sydney) (4)
- United States (Cal Maritime - Vallejo, CA, University of Hawaii or APCSS) (5)

SPONSOR CONTRIBUTIONS REQUIRED:

- Funding. Setup and seeding.
- Teaching and Research Experts (professors and practitioners).
- Diplomatic and assistance efforts to recruit partners, participants, and students.

RISKS & MITIGATIONS:

- Costly
  - Multiple sponsors spread material and non-material costs.
  - Build on existing education and research infrastructure.
  - Seek industry support and foster public-private partnerships within the COE.
- Disrupted by PRC competition
  - Quietly don’t invite representatives of states undermining maritime governance, to include China.
- Militarization
  - Defuse a militarization of the COE which would undermine its long-term prospects by deliberately deemphasizing military contributions and participation. Focus on law enforcement, civilian agencies, and civil sector. Put it under civilian leadership.