

Panacea for Gaza

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Key Points

- The complexity of the Israel-Palestine conflict is rooted in the late 19th century and is enduringly exacerbated by polarization and radicalization on both sides.
- The adoption of a Gaza-centric approach is deemed inadequate, as a comprehensive regional comprehension of the matter, coupled with a regional strategy, is posited as the sole viable means to address the issue effectively; any approach towards stabilizing Gaza is inherently complex and multifaceted, necessitating a series of incremental steps that demand time, patience, and commitment.
- In exploring potential approaches to Gaza stabilization, three distinct strategies emerge: "**Painkiller**" (by Israel), "**Placebo**" (by the US), and "**Panacea**" (Israel-Palestine 3-Phase Plan (IP3PP) by CSAG).
- The CSAG IP3PP is a comprehensive 3-Phase Plan that consists of three Lines of Effort (Security, Governance, Development), Decisive Conditions and Decision Points to achieve three objectives (Security, Sovereignty, Integration) that will contribute to a stable and prosperous region.

Introduction

The quest for stability in Gaza has long been a focal point of international attention, particularly in the context of the Israeli-Hamas conflict and the broader Palestinian issue. However, the traditional approach to addressing this complex challenge may be overly narrow in scope. It is increasingly evident that a comprehensive regional solution, rather than a singular focus on Gaza, may hold the key to sustainable peace and stability in the region.

The concept of a "Two-state Solution" has often been touted as the most viable path towards resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, the ambiguity surrounding this term raises critical questions about its true meaning and feasibility. Politicians frequently invoke this phrase as a catch-all solution without delving into the nuanced details required for its successful implementation. This lack of clarity not only undermines public understanding but also risks reducing the "Two-state Solution" to a mere "buzzword" devoid of substantive content.

Any approach towards stabilizing Gaza is inherently complex and multifaceted, necessitating a series of incremental steps that demand time, patience, and unwavering commitment. While various stakeholders advocate for different strategies, Israel's specific roadmap for stabilizing Gaza remains largely undisclosed, with the focus primarily centered on addressing the Hamas factor.

Moreover, significant obstacles loom on the path to stabilization, with the imperative need for a ceasefire emerging as a fundamental prerequisite for any potential progress. Despite this essential requirement, Israel's seeming reluctance to engage in ceasefire discussions, and certainly its uncompromising public rhetoric, poses a formidable challenge that must be navigated to pave the way for constructive dialogue and meaningful solutions.¹

In light of these considerations, this paper proposes a comprehensive plan supporting the idea of a “Two-state Solution” as a means to address these multifaceted challenges, aiming for a strategic environment conducive to the stabilization of Gaza and the broader region.

The Environment

The protracted Israel-Palestine conflict, with its roots stretching back to the late 19th century, has seen numerous attempts at resolution, notably the UNSC Resolution 242 of 1967, aimed at establishing a framework for peace and the coexistence of Israel and Palestine.² Despite these efforts, a lasting solution has remained elusive, with the question of Palestine encompassing both Gaza and the West Bank.³ The conflict took a dramatic turn on October 7, 2023, with an unprecedented Hamas attacks on Israel, marking a historic escalation.⁴ Israel's response, focused on the destruction of Hamas, the demilitarization of Gaza, and the release of hostages, has not translated into a genuine pursuit of a sustainable peace solution. This has exacerbated the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, with the Israeli campaign intensifying the suffering of its inhabitants and no immediate peace plan in sight.⁵ The situation is further complicated by external influences, including Iranian support for its proxies and the regional destabilization that benefits Iran, alongside Hezbollah's activities in Lebanon. The roles of regional countries (Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, Türkiye) and external actors (including Russia⁶, the US and the EU) are pivotal, yet the phenomenon of regional polarization and radicalization, alongside a lack of effective leadership and institutional crises, notably within the UN, hampers progress.⁷ The US's unconditional support for Israel further complicates regional partnerships.⁸ Furthermore, the US' utilization of military installations within the territories (including Access Basing Overflight (ABO)) of certain Arab nations, notably the United Arab Emirates (UAE), is facing increasing restrictions. This trend is influenced by concerns among these Arab countries about potential retaliation if they allow the US to operate

¹ Samia Nakhoul, Andrew Mills, Nidal Al-Mughrabi and Humeyra Pamuk, “Netanyahu Calls Hamas Ceasefire Proposal 'Delusional' but Blinken Sees Scope for progress,” *Reuters*, February 7, 2024, <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/gaza-mediators-search-final-formula-israel-hamas-ceasefire-2024-02-07/> (accessed February 27, 2024).

² UN, “Security Council Resolution 242: The Situation in the Middle East,” *UN Peacemaker*, November 22, 1967, <https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SCRes242%281967%29.pdf> (accessed October 7, 2023). UN, “The Question of Palestine,” <https://www.un.org/unispal/history/> (accessed February 10, 2024).

³ Ibid.

⁴ Center for Preventive Action, “Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” *Global Conflict Tracker*, February 09, 2024, <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/israeli-palestinian-conflict> (accessed February 10, 2024).

⁵ NA. Gale Academic OneFile, “Gaza Humanitarian Disaster Heralds 'Breakdown' of Society,” *States News Service*, December 08, 2023, (accessed March 12, 2024). <https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A775706213/AONE?u=anon~efa0d5ca&sid=sitemap&xid=d87ae9e4>.

⁶ Pjotr Sauer, “Why Are Ties Between Russia and Israel 'at Lowest Point Since Fall of The Soviet Union'?”, *The Guardian*, December 30, 2023, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/30/why-are-ties-between-russia-and-israel-at-lowest-point-since-fall-of-the-soviet-union> (accessed January 5, 2024).

⁷ Devorah Margolin, Matthew Levitt, “The Road to October 7: Hamas' Long Game, Clarified,” *The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point*, <https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-road-to-october-7-hamas-long-game-clarified/> (accessed January 8, 2024).

⁸ Jim Zanotti, Jeremy M. Sharp, Christopher M. Blanchard, “Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs),” *Congressional Research Service*, October 20, 2023, <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47754> (accessed November 22, 2024).

from their soil, as demonstrated by Iran's warning to Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE of reprisals if they facilitated a US attack.⁹

The October 7 Israeli-Hamas conflict stands out from previous conflicts between Israel and Palestinian factions for several reasons, one of which is the resumption of direct targeting of US troops by Iran-backed proxies. Since the outbreak of the conflict on October 7, 2023, there have been more than 175 attacks on US forces by these proxies. This escalation has raised concerns about the potential for a broader conflict involving the US and Iran, despite both nations indicating they do not seek direct confrontation.¹⁰ The backdrop to this situation involves a complex web of regional dynamics, where Iran-backed fighters, including the Houthi in Yemen and various groups in Iraq and Syria, have engaged in aggressive actions against US and Western allies' interests.¹¹ Iran's role in the conflict is particularly noteworthy. While Tehran has denied direct involvement in Hamas' initial attack on Israel, it has ramped up its rhetoric against Israel and continued to provide political and moral support to Hamas. This support extends to other proxies in the region, which share Iran's anti-Israel stance.¹² The involvement of these proxies, that operate with varying degrees of independence from Tehran, increases the odds of a direct clash not only with Israel but also with the US.¹³

What are the potential approaches to Gaza stabilization?

In exploring potential approaches to Gaza stabilization, three distinct approaches emerge. The first approach, termed the "Painkiller"¹⁴ strategy, is Israel's focus on the destruction of Hamas, the demilitarization of Gaza, and the "deradicalization" of Palestinian society. This approach aims to dismantle the militant infrastructure and foster a shift towards peace by exerting greater control over Palestinian territories. However, for the moment, the Israeli government's most perilous endeavor has deviated from the fundamental tenets of the peace process and repudiates the principle of land for peace. Subsequently, it recommenced its colonization of the occupied Palestinian territories (West Bank), encompassing Jerusalem, followed by systematic efforts to circumvent and nullify all accords established between the Palestinian and Israeli factions.¹⁵

The second approach, labeled as the "Placebo,"¹⁶ results from the approach advocated by the current US Administration. This approach faces challenges and limitations, being viewed as a temporary measure rather than a comprehensive solution. The plan emphasizes reducing civilian casualties, the more deliberate dismantling Hamas,

⁹ Lara Seligman, Alexander Ward and Nahal Toosi, "UAE Restricts US Ability to Launch Retaliatory Airstrikes Against Iran Proxies," *POLITICO*, February 14, 2024, <https://www.politico.com/news/2024/02/14/united-arab-emirates-retaliatory-airstrikes-iran-00141460> (accessed February 15, 2024).

¹⁰ Nadeen Ebrahim, "Iran May Not Want a Full-Blown War with ISRAEL, But It May Be Dragged Into One," *CNN*, October 27, 2023, <https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/27/middleeast/iran-may-not-want-full-war-israel-mime-intl/index.html> (accessed February 12, 2024).

¹¹ Chas Danner, "Are the U.S. and Iran Inching Toward War?" *Intelligencer*, February 4, 2024, <https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2024/02/commentary-roundup-are-the-us-and-iran-inching-toward-war.html> (accessed February 13, 2024).

¹² Ibid 10.

¹³ Zvi Bar'el, "Attacks by Iran's 'Independent' Proxies Increase Odds of Direct Clash With Israel and U.S.," *Haaretz*, December 28, 2023, <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-12-28/ty-article/.premium/attacks-by-irans-independent-proxies-increase-odds-of-direct-clash-with-israel-and-u-s/0000018c-ad16-d22d-a3dd-bd7f52010000> (accessed February 12, 2024).

¹⁴ Painkiller – an agent (frequently a drug or medicine) which alleviates pain. *Oxford English Dictionary*, <https://www.oed.com/search/dictionary/?scope=Entries&q=painkiller> (accessed February 27, 2024).

¹⁵ By the editors of CBS News, "Israel Plans to Build Thousands More West Bank Settlement Homes After Shooting Attack, Official Says", *CBS NEWS*, February 23, 2024, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/israel-west-bank-settlement-homes-palestinian-shooting-attack-smotrich-netanyahu/> (accessed February 27, 2024).

¹⁶ Placebo – a usually pharmacologically inert preparation prescribed more for the mental relief of the patient than for its actual effect on a disorder, *Merriam-Webster Dictionary*, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/placebo> (accessed February 27, 2024).

and advocating for a post-conflict role for the Palestinian Authority. However, disagreements persist between the US and Israel on tactics and timing, with Israel prioritizing a swift dismantling of Hamas while the US focuses on humanitarian assistance and avoiding excessive civilian casualties. The complexities of the conflict, differing priorities, and historical tensions contribute to the view that the current plan may serve as a temporary measure rather than a long-term resolution to the deep-rooted issues in the region.¹⁷

Lastly, the comprehensive "Panacea"¹⁸ approach of CSAG advocates for a permanent ceasefire, extensive humanitarian assistance, mutual release of hostages and prisoners, deployment of a Multinational Force & Observers¹⁹ (MFO), implementation of Quick Impact Projects (QIP) for essential services restoration, the establishment of a Palestinian Technocratic government under a Palestinian authority in Gaza and the West Bank,²⁰ and regional engagement towards a Two-state Solution without concessions to disrupt the cycle of violence underpinned by a solid financial plan coordinated amongst allies and partners.²¹

Each approach offers unique perspectives on addressing Gaza's challenges with varying degrees of complexity and potential impact on long-term stability and peace in the region. Therefore, in the subsequent section of this paper, the third approach – "Panacea", will be elucidated, as it advocates for a Two-state Solution without any concessions in order to break the enduring "vicious circle of violence."

"Panacea" the Israeli-Palestinian 3-Phase Plan (IP3PP) as a Comprehensive Approach to Ensuring Security in Gaza

The IP3PP is a novel proposal aimed at ensuring security in the Gaza Strip through a comprehensive approach that spans short-term, mid-term, and long-term objectives.

In its title, the plan refers to the Gaza Strip, while in principle, the plan has a regional scope, as in the search for a resolution of this conflict, one should look at the region as a whole.

The IP3PP is structured into three distinct phases (*see Annex 1*, page 10), each with specific time frames: Phase I (short-term, 1-2 years), Phase II (mid-term, 3-4 years), and Phase III (long-term, 5-10 years). This timeframe is defined by the dynamics of the stabilization processes from a state in chaos and destroyed by warfare to a fully functional state of order, law, security, and prosperity.

Accordingly, these three phases can be called respectively: Phase I – "Immediate Stabilization", Phase II – "International Recognition and Security Enhancement", and Phase III – "Coexistence and Self-Reliance". Each stabilization operation requires positioning efforts in a specific domain and arranging them in the desired sequence. Comprehensiveness of a stabilization operation requires strategizing the effort in key domains related to *security*,

¹⁷ Karen DeYoung, Susannah George, and Loveday Morris, "U.S., Arab Nations Plan for Postwar Gaza, Timeline for Palestinian State", *The Washington Post*, February 14, 2024, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/02/14/gaza-peace-israel-palestinian-state/> (accessed February 16, 2024).

¹⁸ Panacea – figurative. Something used to solve all problems; a practice or course of action adopted in every case of difficulty; a universal cure. *Oxford English Dictionary*, <https://www.oed.com/search/dictionary/?scope=Entries&q=panacea> (accessed February 27, 2024).

¹⁹ The Multinational Force & Observers (MFO) is an international peacekeeping force with a mission to supervise the security provisions and to prevent violations terms of a treaty of peace. It is known from the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of Peace signed in Washington, D.C. on March 26, 1979, following the 1978 Camp David Accords. Established in 1981, the MFO was an alternative to a UN peacekeeping force. The MFO employs both military contingents and a civilian workforce, including International Staff and Non-International Technical and Administrative Support Staff, to support peace and regional stability efforts. MFO.org, "Mission of MFO," <https://mfo.org> (accessed February 16, 2023).

²⁰ Currently, the Palestinian Authority administers the West Bank, and Hamas administers Gaza.

²¹ Natan Sachs, "Peace Between Israelis and Palestinians Remains Possible", *Foreign Affairs*, January 19, 2024, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/peace-between-israelis-and-palestinians-remains-possible> (accessed March 6, 2024).

governance, and development. These domains determine the Lines of Effort for the stabilization operation and enable further sequencing of actions to achieve the stated goals of the operation.²² Consequently, the plan is organized along three Lines of Effort (LoE): Security, Governance, and Development (*see Annex 1*), with 12 Decisive Conditions (*see Annex 2, page 11*) to achieve three target objectives of Security, Sovereignty, and Integration. In the plan, four Decision Points (DPs) are identified. The first point - “Ceasefire”(DP 1) establishes a conducive environment for plan implementation, while the subsequent points - “Successful Effectiveness Readiness Evaluation (ERE)” (DP 2-4),²³ to identify the presence of favorable circumstances for transitioning from one phase to another.

Security (Line of Effort 1)

Phase I. The immediate focus in Phase I is to halt the ongoing war by securing a ceasefire (Decision Point 1) and establishing a negotiation team. Potential incentives to attract the parties to engage in ceasefire talks include various factors. First, there is a growing call within Israel for a ceasefire to save Israeli captives held by Hamas and to prevent further civilian casualties in Gaza.²⁴ Additionally, the desire for a temporary or permanent end to the fighting is gaining traction among Israelis who believe that the current war is futile and counterproductive.²⁵ International pressure, including calls from prominent figures, for a pause in the conflict also plays a role in incentivizing ceasefire discussions.²⁶ Moreover, the exchange of captives between Israel and Palestine as part of truce agreements can offer hope and relief to affected families, potentially serving as a positive step towards peace.²⁷ These incentives collectively contribute to creating an environment where both parties may find motivation to come to the table for ceasefire negotiations, emphasizing the importance of humanitarian considerations, international pressure, and internal calls for peace.

It is crucial for the US to take a role of the broker, as the US is the only country that can convince Israel to discontinue the use of force and take immediate stabilization measures. Also, the immediate focus includes the release of hostages, and the exchange of prisoners is prioritized with a gradual approach that considers the vulnerability of certain groups.²⁸ Additionally, the formation and deployment of Multinational Force & Observers (MFO) teams²⁹, comprising EU and regional countries, aims to supervise a potential treaty that is cognizant of security concerns for both parties, prevent hostilities, and augmenting the Palestinian Security Forces (PSF) by 50%.³⁰ A critical step for

²² Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, “DoD Directive 3000.05 Stabilization,” December 13, 2018, <https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/300005p.pdf?ver=2018-12-13-145923-550> (accessed March 12, 2024).

²³ The Effectiveness Readiness Evaluation (ERE). The ERE functions as a comprehensive assessment mechanism designed to gauge the operational preparedness and efficacy of (local) security forces designated to gradually take over responsibility of security of an area (a country) covered by a stabilization operation. ERE assesses various readiness indicators and performance metrics in pursue of a high level of operational effectiveness and responsiveness in transitioning between different phases of stabilizing operations. MFO.org, “Mission of MFO,” <https://mfo.org> (accessed February 16, 2023).

²⁴ Mat Nashed, “The Israelis Who Want a Ceasefire in their Country’s War on Gaza,” *ALJAZEERA*, March 5, 2024, <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2024/3/5/the-israelis-who-want-a-ceasefire-in-israels-war-on-gaza> (accessed March 10, 2024).

²⁵ *Ibid* 23.

²⁶ Urooba Jamal, “Israel-Hamas Truce Comes Into Effect: How It Could Now Unfold,” *ALJAZEERA*, November 24, 2023, <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/11/24/israel-hamas-truce-comes-into-effect-how-it-could-now-unfold> (accessed March 10, 2024).

²⁷ Tia Goldenberg, “What Does the Cease-Fire Between Israel and Hamas Look Like?” *The Associated Press*, November 24, 2023, <https://apnews.com/article/israel-hamas-war-ceasefire-what-to-know-af1cfbc9dcaa1485ed7a9efaca7ec2b7> (accessed March 10, 2024).

²⁸ Considering the vulnerability of groups of wounded people, children, women, elderly, etc., priority should be given to those that are in greatest need of immediate care or attention.

²⁹ *Ibid* 22.

³⁰ The other 50% of security forces will be provided by MFO. Over time the percentage of PSF will gradually increase and MFO will decrease.

the MFO HQ is to conduct the first assessment (Effectiveness Readiness Evaluation – ERE) to ensure the requirements of the PSF capabilities are met. Successful ERE 1 constitutes Decision Point 2 that enables transition from Phase I to Phase II.

Potential role/tasks of CENTCOM on LoE 1 in Ph I:

CENTCOM and its allies and partners play a pivotal role in stabilizing regions within its area of responsibility, which includes the Middle East and Central Asia. In the context of Gaza stabilization, CENTCOM's tasks could be multifaceted, encompassing both military and diplomatic efforts.

1. CENTCOM can *contribute to a pre-deployment evaluation team* to better assess the environment and to determine mission requirements, including the number and composition of security forces needed.
2. CENTCOM could *assist in supervising the ceasefire*, as exemplified by its potential oversight of MFO teams, tasked with supervising the implementation of the security provisions of the Palestinian-Israeli peace treaty.³¹ This role would involve ensuring adherence to the agreed terms and preventing violations, thereby contributing to regional security and stability.
3. In collaboration with international partners, CENTCOM could also *assist in the exchange of hostages and prisoners*, a task that aligns with its mission to work with allies and partners to increase regional security.
4. Supporting the capacity building and empowerment of PSF is another critical task. CENTCOM could *provide assistance to the PSF* to professionalize and enhance its capabilities. This assistance would be in line with CENTCOM's broader strategy of building strong relationships with regional leaders and maintaining access to shared facilities, as well as conducting joint and combined exercises with regional partners.
5. Assisting regional partners in the *protection of humanitarian corridors* is another area where CENTCOM could contribute. This task would involve ensuring safe passage for humanitarian aid and personnel, which is essential for the well-being of civilian populations in conflict zones.
6. CENTCOM's *cooperation with partners and allies in support of the MFO HQs* during evaluation (ERE 1) would be crucial for assessing the effectiveness of the force and making necessary adjustments to its operations.
7. CENTCOM's ongoing efforts to *counter Iranian Threat Network (ITN) and Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs)* are integral to preventing destabilizing activities in the region, including those steered by Iran.

Phase II. In Phase II, the plan seeks international recognition of the Palestinian state through UN resolutions (based on UNSCR242) and security arrangements. This phase includes addressing the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes, relocating illegal Israeli settlements in the West Bank,³² respecting the status of Jerusalem, and demilitarizing the Palestinian state. The security capability of Palestine is further advanced by securing borders with the assistance of the MFO and international patrols, followed by the second MFO HQs evaluation (ERE 2). Successfully completing ERE 2 constitutes Decision Point 3 that enables transition from Phase II to Phase III.

Potential role/tasks of CENTCOM on LoE 1 in Ph II:

1. CENTCOM could *assist MFO in the demilitarization of Palestine*, contributing to regional security and peace. Secondly, it could support capacity building and empowerment of PSF, enhancing their ability to maintain stability and security within Gaza.

³¹ Ibid 22.

³² As articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 13, <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights> (accessed March 21, 2024); UNSCR 242, 1967, Ibid 2; The Fourth Geneva Convention, <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949> (accessed March 21, 2024).

2. CENTCOM could *establish a Joint Monitoring Team (JMT)*³³ to assist the PSF and regional partners in protecting humanitarian corridors, facilitating the safe return of refugees, and securing borders including the Palestinian sea border.
3. *Cooperation with partners and allies during evaluations* (second ERE) strengthens collaborative efforts towards stabilization.
4. CENTCOM continues its efforts in *countering ITN and VEOs* to prevent destabilizing activities in the region, further contributing to Gaza's stability and security.

Phase III. Phase III envisions a future where Israel and Palestine coexist and cooperate on security and economic issues. The Palestinian security forces are expected to be fully operational and self-reliant, supported by international observers. The successful implementation of a Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) program for both sides and a third MFO HQ evaluation are key undertakings. The US, allies and partners could launch a Mega-Project for sustainable development and pave the road for Palestinian/ Israeli integration. Successfully completing ERE 3 constitutes Decision Point 4 which is a fulfilment of the prerequisites for the attainment of the objective³⁴ pursued in the Line of Effort "Security."

Potential role/tasks of CENTCOM on LoE 1 in Ph III:

1. CENTCOM could *support capacity building* and empowerment of the PSF, aiming to enhance their capabilities and effectiveness.
2. CENTCOM can *assist the PSF* in transitioning to full responsibility for security within the region, ensuring a smooth handover process. The maintenance of JMT by CENTCOM is vital for supporting the PSF and regional partners in safeguarding borders, including the Palestinian/Israeli sea borders, thereby contributing to overall security.
3. In collaboration with partners in MFO teams, CENTCOM can *aid in implementing the DDR program*, facilitating the reduction of armed groups and promoting stability.
4. Cooperation with allies during the third evaluation (ERE 3) strengthens assessment processes and enhances strategic planning.
5. CENTCOM's efforts in conjunction with allies and partners in *countering ITN and VEOs* are crucial for preventing destabilizing activities in the region, ensuring a secure environment for sustainable peace and development.

Governance (Line of Effort 2)

Phase I. In Phase I, the establishment of a legal foundation for the state of Palestine is crucial. This includes release and recognition of political leaders e.g., Mr. Marwan Barghouti. While Mr. Barghouti is acknowledged as a terrorist by Israel,³⁵ he is revered as a Palestinian patriot and enjoys widespread acceptance across all Palestinian factions

³³ The Joint Monitoring Team (JMT) is a military-civilian establishment that functions as a joint combined operational center composed of various liaison officers and civilian specialists from partner and ally nations. It is primarily focused on monitoring borders, often utilized in stabilization operations. The JMT closely collaborates with the Multinational Force & Observers (MFO) Headquarters to enhance border security enforcement. The MFO, on the other hand, employs a civilian workforce, including International Staff and Non-International Technical and Administrative Support Staff, to support peace and regional stability efforts in locations such as Sinai, Cairo, Tel Aviv, and Rome. MFO.org, "Mission of MFO," <https://mfo.org> (accessed February 16, 2023); Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Publication 3-57, Civil-Military Operations," July 9, 2018, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_57.pdf?ver=2018-09-13-134111-460 (accessed February 16, 2023).

³⁴ Objective 1 (O_1) - "Palestine and Israel Secured" (see Annex 1).

³⁵ Julia Frankel, " Hamas Demands Israel Release Marwan Barghouti, a Man Some Palestinians See As Their Nelson Mandela", *The Associated Press*, February 3, 2024, <https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-hamas-marwan-barghouti-ceasefire-deal-fb3152db0cc4d37683a2019017e34bc1> (accessed February 5, 2024).

being “viewed by some Palestinians as their Nelson Mandela.”³⁶ Consequently, there is a prevailing sentiment that his release and formal recognition as the Palestinian leader are imperative to catalyze a transformative trajectory towards stability. Furthermore, the formation of the Palestinian Technocratic Government³⁷ is paramount. The technocratic government would theoretically oversee Gaza and would not have any Hamas members. This initiative is seen as a way to handle the administrative affairs of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank with representation from all Palestinian factions. The plan seeks to restore national unity, end division and to create a Palestinian security force in Gaza. Hamas has reportedly agreed to the formation of a technocratic government in Gaza and expressed support for a two-state solution. The following step would be to elect a Palestinian authority and the establishment of an electoral team. The initiation of government institutions (phase 1) is also a critical step.

Potential role/tasks of CENTCOM on LoE 2 in Ph I:

1. Together with the partners, CENTCOM could *provide security* for administrative and governmental processes.

Phase II. Phase II focuses on the formalization of the Palestinian Constitution through referenda and full operationalization of Palestinian government institutions (phase 2), with local elections organized under international supervision. Also, the phase includes declaration of independence of the Palestinian state based on UNSCR242.

Potential role/tasks of CENTCOM on LoE 2 in Ph II:

1. The JMT could *assist PSF and regional partners* in providing security for administrative and governmental processes. Moreover, the JMT could assist the PSF in assuming responsibility for security of administrative and governmental processes.

Phase III. In Phase III, the long-term goal is for Palestine to function as a rule of law state, with subsequent elections organized in an orderly and lawful manner.

Potential role/tasks of CENTCOM on LoE 2 in Ph III:

1. In Phase III, the JMT could continue to *assist the PSF* in assuming responsibility of security for administrative and governmental processes.

Development (Line of Effort 3)

Phase I. In Phase I, the immediate development objectives include Quick Impact Projects (QIP) to restore basic needs such as energy, water, and food. Reconstruction of refugee camps and schools, resumption of Palestinian workers in Israel, and the resumption of trade with Egypt and the EU are also prioritized.

Potential role/tasks of CENTCOM on LoE 3 in Ph I:

1. One of its primary tasks could be to *collaborate with partners to ensure security* for various initiatives, including ongoing QIPs, essential services reconstruction projects, and Refugee Camps reconstruction projects.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ The technocratic government is a government composed of individuals based on their technical expertise and knowledge rather than political ideologies.

2. CENTCOM could work alongside partners and allies to *provide vital logistics and engineering support* for ongoing reconstruction projects, ensuring their successful implementation. Furthermore, together with the partners and allies it could provide the security of Palestinian workers' movement and trading channels, facilitating the flow of resources and personnel essential for Gaza's development.
3. CENTCOM could *engage in a soft power campaign to promote* the positive impact of US QIPs, enhancing the perception of the US involvement in Gaza's stabilization efforts.

Phase II. The mid-term development Phase II involves establishing infrastructure, including housing and public services, and implementing confidence-building measures.

Potential role/tasks of CENTCOM on LoE 3 in Ph II:

1. CENTCOM together with the partners can *provide security* for ongoing infrastructure building projects. Furthermore, together with the partners and allies, it could provide logistics and engineering support to ongoing infrastructure projects.

Phase III. The long-term development Phase III aims to realize mega-projects for sustainable development, such as seaports, airports, and land connections, to open Palestine externally.

Potential role/tasks of CENTCOM on LoE 3 in Ph III:

1. One significant aspect involves collaborating with partners to *support the PSF* in ensuring security for ongoing development projects within the region. This assistance not only contributes to the safety of these initiatives but also fosters an environment conducive to sustainable growth and progress.
2. CENTCOM, in conjunction with partners and allies, *aids the PSF* by providing logistical and engineering support for infrastructure projects, thereby enhancing the capacity and effectiveness of these endeavors.
3. As part of broader US regional initiatives, CENTCOM *engages with military partners to implement security-building and innovation projects*. These efforts are integral to enhancing strategic competitiveness in the region, showcasing a multifaceted approach that combines security cooperation, infrastructure development, and strategic innovation to promote stability and progress in Gaza.

Risk Assessment

In the context of exploring potential approaches to Gaza stabilization, several risks emerge that could impede the effectiveness of the plan or lead to a complete fiasco. Firstly, the failure to meet a prerequisite of productive negotiations characterized by Israeli reluctance to abandon violent solutions and lack of willingness of the US to impose sufficient cost on Israel to unlock peace mediation. Additionally, the absence of hope for a ceasefire further complicates the situation. The potential return of Hamas to power through upcoming elections introduces another layer of complexity, potentially hindering progress towards stability. Moreover, the unresolved issue of hostages and the resulting prolongation of conflict could lead to an endless cycle of violence. The limited availability of humanitarian aid exacerbates the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, adding urgency to stabilization efforts. Furthermore, the successful interference of ITN and VEOs in destabilizing the region poses a threat to any stabilization initiatives. Addressing root causes promptly is crucial, as delaying action risks perpetuating the conflict indefinitely. Lastly, unwavering support for Israel may tarnish the reputation of the US and CENTCOM in the region, impacting diplomatic

efforts and complicating potential solutions. These risks underscore the multifaceted challenges inherent in addressing Gaza's stabilization and emphasize the need for comprehensive and nuanced approaches in any thesis on this critical issue.

Following the outbreak of the conflict, several Arab nations, notably the UAE, are progressively imposing limitations on the US utilization of military installations (ABO) within their territories for launching counteroffensive airstrikes against Iranian proxies.³⁸ This situation has presented a dilemma for Arab governments, as they navigate between addressing their populace's discontent towards Israel and assisting Washington in repelling attacks supported by Iran. Against the backdrop of escalating civilian casualties in Gaza, a number of Arab countries, particularly those engaged in diplomatic reconciliation efforts with Iran, are increasingly constraining the US and its allies from executing defensive operations from their territories. These restrictions encompass curbs on retaliatory actions against assaults in Iraq, Syria, and the Red Sea region.

Conclusion


The "IP3PP" presents a structured and phased approach to resolving the security issues in Gaza by addressing the immediate need for peace, the establishment of governance, and the development of infrastructure and economy. The success of this plan hinges on the earnest cooperation of international actors (regional partners and allies), the commitment of Israeli and Palestinian leadership, and the effective implementation of each phase's Decisive Conditions.

It should be noted that a prerequisite for the success of the Plan is an immediate ceasefire (DP 1), the willingness of Israel to abandon a violent solution and to mediate, and the acceptance of the US to take one of the roles of mediators in the peace process.

While ambitious, the IP3PP offers a comprehensive framework that could potentially lead to lasting peace and security in the region. The ambitiousness of this plan is due to the complexity of the moral, humanitarian and political situation, and it must be assumed that even under favorable conditions and with the fulfilment of the specified Decisive Conditions, the stabilization process will take many years, and several generations to heal the wounds of the loss of so many victims on both sides of the conflict, or it may not even be possible and remain a cause for new unrest and conflict, especially if exploited by ITN and VEOs.

³⁸ Lara Seligman, Alexander Ward and Nahal Toosi, "UAE Restricts US Ability to Launch Retaliatory Airstrikes Against Iran Proxies," *POLITICO*, February 14, 2024, <https://www.politico.com/news/2024/02/14/united-arab-emirates-retaliatory-airstrikes-iran-00141460> (accessed February 15, 2024).

IP3PP Visualization of Lines of Effort³⁹



³⁹ By CSAG.

IP3PP Visualization of Lines of Effort⁴⁰

	Phase I, Short-Term (1-2 year)	Phase II, Mid-Term (3-4 year)	Phase III, Long-Term (5-10 year)
LoE 1 Security	<p>DP 1_Cease Fire conditions bilaterally Recognized</p> <p>DC 1.1_War is Stopped</p> <p>E 1.1.1_Negotiation Team Established – the US broking</p> <p>E 1.1.2_Host ages Released</p> <p>E 1.1.3_Humanitarian Aid Unlimited</p>	<p>DC 1.3_Legal foundations of the PAL state Ensured</p> <p>E 1.3.1_Security arrangements Agreed and the JMT established</p> <p>E 1.3.2_Refugees' Right to Return Arranged</p> <p>E 1.3.3_Illegal Israeli settlements Ceased</p> <p>E 1.3.4_Status of Jerusalem Acknowledged</p> <p>E 1.3.5_PAL (Sea) Border Determined</p> <p>E 1.3.6_PAL state Demilitarized</p> <p>E 1.3.7_PAL state UN Resolution Declared</p>	<p>DC 1.5_ISR-PAL coexistence conditions Ensured</p> <p>E 1.5.1_Future ISR-PAL integration</p> <p>E 1.5.2_Intergovernmental, Security and Economic Cooperation Undisrupted</p>
	<p>DC 1.2_PAL security enforcement cap. Assured</p> <p>E 1.2.1_Pre-deployment evaluation team Deployed</p> <p>E 1.2.2_MFO mission Formed (EU + Regional countries)</p> <p>E 1.2.3_MFO's Deployed</p> <p>E 1.2.4_Hostilities from both sides Prevented</p> <p>E 1.2.5_PSF cap. Strengthened up to 50%</p> <p>DP 2_ERE 1 successfully Conducted</p>	<p>DC 1.4_PAL security enforcement cap. effective</p> <p>E 1.4.1_PSF 50% responsibility Achieved</p> <p>E 1.4.2_Borders Secured (Supervised by MFO, and multinational patrols)</p> <p>DP 3_ERE 2 successfully Conducted</p>	<p>DC 1.6_PAL security enforcement cap. self -reliant</p> <p>E 1.6.1_Security enforcement fully Assured by PSF</p> <p>E 1.6.2_LNOs and International Observers presence Assured</p> <p>E 1.6.3_DDR Program Implemented</p> <p>DP 4_ERE 3 successfully Conducted</p>
LoE 2 Governance	<p>DC 2.1_The foundations of stable PAL country are Commenced</p> <p>E 2.1.1_Mr. Marawan Barghothy Released and Recognized as the PAL political leader</p> <p>E 2.1.2_Technocratic government formed</p> <p>E 2.1.2_PAL Authority Established</p> <p>E 2.1.3_Electoral Team Established</p> <p>E 2.1.4_PAL governmental institutions Build (stage 1)</p>	<p>DC 2.2_Legal foundations of the state Assured</p> <p>E 2.2.1_Constitution Committee Formed</p> <p>E 2.2.1_Constitution Formalized (by Referenda)</p> <p>E 2.2.3_Local elections Organized (respect outcome, monitored and supervised)</p> <p>E 2.2.4_PAL governmental institutions Build (stage 2)</p>	<p>DC 2.3_Legal foundations of the state Respected</p> <p>E 2.3.1_Regular, fully -fledged and recognized PAL elections</p>
LoE 3 Development	<p>DC 3.1_QIPs Commenced</p> <p>E 3.1.1_Essential services Reconstructed</p> <p>E 3.1.2_Refugee Camps Reconstructed</p> <p>E 3.1.3_Schools Reconstructed</p> <p>E 3.1.4_PAL workers in Israel Resumed</p> <p>E 3.1.5_Trading with Egypt Resumed</p> <p>E 3.1.6_Export PAL products EU Resumed</p>	<p>DC 3.2_Confidence building measures Implemented</p> <p>E 3.2.1_Infrastructure Established (housing, public services)</p>	<p>DC 3.3_ISR-PAL beneficial coexistence Ensured</p> <p>E 3.3.1_Mega-Project for sustainable development Realized (Sea/Airport, Border X -ing Egypt)</p>
<p>LoE – Line of Effort DC – Decisive Condition DP – Decision Point E – Effect PAL – Palestine/Palestinian PSF – Palestinian Security Forces QIP – Quick Impact Project MFO – Multinational Force & Observers JMT – Joint Monitoring Team</p>			

⁴⁰ By CSAG.