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After Epic Fury: Winning the War but Losing Iran?

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After Epic Fury: Winning the War but Losing Iran?

CSAG STRATEGY PAPER
Combined Strategic Analysis Group (CSAG) – CCJ5-G-USCENTCOM

20 March 2026

 

 

 

 

 

Introduction:

Iran 2026 is not Iraq 2003, nor Egypt 2011. Structural, institutional, and societal conditions differ in ways that will shape the trajectory of any post–Operation Epic Fury environment. Nearly five decades after the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Iran retains a disciplined security architecture, an entrenched bureaucratic apparatus, and tightly woven communal networks. These characteristics sharply distinguish Iran from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq at the moment of its regime collapse in 2003, while also setting it apart from Egypt’s partially intact but politically contested state during the post-Mubarak transition, which maintained internal stability largely due to the support of the military institution.

Iran’s institutional features do not eliminate the risk of disorder. However, they suggest that fragmentation, should central authority weaken, would likely unfold more gradually and unevenly than the rapid state collapse observed in Iraq. Iran would retain residual administrative capacity and coercive structures capable of shaping the trajectory of a political transition. At the same time, the country could experience crises of legitimacy and contested governance similar to those that followed the Egyptian uprising of 2011. The experience of Iraq remains the most instructive cautionary case. The rapid dismantling of state institutions, the dissolution of the Iraqi Army, and sweeping de-Ba’athification policies created institutional vacuums exploited by internal and external malign actors that fueled insurgency and empowered extremist organizations. Egypt’s experience illustrates a different risk: preserving core state institutions without establishing an inclusive and credible political order can lead to prolonged instability and recurring protests, as exemplified by the 2013 revolution that removed the Muslim Brotherhood from power. However, together, these cases demonstrate a central lesson: the removal of a regime does not automatically produce political stability or legitimate governance.

This paper examines Iran’s potential post-Operation Epic Fury environment across three interdependent domains: security, governance, and economics. These domains represent the principal drivers of post-conflict stabilization and state resilience. Particular attention is paid to the cohesion of Iran’s security institutions, the role of communal and regional networks in maintaining local order, and the uneven distribution of administrative capacity across Iran.

Stabilization in the aftermath of Operation Epic Fury will depend less on the scale of military success than on the ability to preserve essential governance functions before instability spreads. The durability of the Iranian state will hinge not only on coercive force but on the management of institutional continuity, political legitimacy, and economic recovery—factors that military operations alone cannot determine.

Read the complete paper here.

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of a number of international officers within the Combined Strategic Analysis Group (CSAG) and do not necessarily reflect the views of United States Central Command, not of the nations represented within the CSAG or any other governmental agency.