Global Chokepoints and Energy Security: Implications for China and U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM)
September 1, 2026 2026-09-01 19:38Global Chokepoints and Energy Security: Implications for China and U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM)
Global Chokepoints and Energy Security: Implications for China and U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM)
CSAG INFORMATION PAPER
Global Chokepoints and Energy Security: Implications for China and U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM)
Caner ÇİFTCİ, Maj., TUR AF, CCJ5-G (CSAG)
19 August 2026

Introduction:
This paper aims to provide an assessment of major global maritime chokepoints, their role in sustaining international energy flows, and China’s dependence on these routes. Additionally, evaluate how these dynamics shape vulnerabilities in China’s energy security posture and outlines the operational implications for U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), within contested maritime environments.a. Global energy supply chains depend on a limited number of maritime chokepoints that connect hydrocarbon-producing regions to global markets. These chokepoints serve as critical nodes within an interconnected system in which disruptions in a single location can generate domino effects across multiple regions. A substantial percentage of globally traded oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) originates in the Middle East and transits narrow waterways to reach consumer markets in Asia and Europe. The concentration of energy flows through these corridors creates systemic risk, as localized disruptions can affect global pricing, cost of insurance, supply availability, and economic stability. Beyond their economic importance, maritime chokepoints possess significant military and geopolitical importance. Controlling, monitoring, or disruption of these routes shapes the operational environment, influences force posture decisions, and affects broader geopolitical competition.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of a number of international officers within the Combined Strategic Analysis Group (CSAG) and do not necessarily reflect the views of United States Central Command, not of the nations represented within the CSAG or any other governmental agency.